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ABSTRACT
  Many past and potential New Zealand reforms involve significant devolution, i.e.
the transfer of authority to make decisions on behalf of society from a higher to
a lower level of government.  In particular the Resource Management Act
(RMA), the health and education reforms, and decisions about the institutions
for addressing Maori issues have led to significant devolution of authority.
Employment policy and social welfare are areas where devolution is an
important policy option.  The role and function of local government also is
inherently an issue of the appropriate level of devolution.  Many of these
reforms have now been in place for a number of years, so it is appropriate to
review our experience of devolution, identify the successes, and attempt to
address the problems that have arisen.
 
Two papers address issues of when and how we should devolve authority from
central to local government. This paper looks at devolution both from a general
theoretical standpoint and from the perspective of the New Zealand Resource
Management Act 1991 (RMA), with residential land use as an illustration.
Although the RMA is discussed throughout both papers, the framework
developed applies to any area of policy for which devolution decisions are being
considered.  The second paper, Treasury Working Paper 98/7a, applies the
framework to the optimal pattern of devolution for policies relating to kiwi
protection.
* Suzi Kerr - University of Maryland at College Park, Megan Claridge & Dominic
Milicich – NZ Treasury.Contents
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
This paper addresses issues of when and how we should devolve authority
from central to local government.  It develops a framework to help answer the
following three questions:
1.  What level of government should make social and political decisions about
policy objectives?
2.  What level of government should bear the costs of these decisions?
3.  What level of government should implement them?
The paper looks at devolution both from a general theoretical standpoint and
from the perspective of the New Zealand Resource Management Act (RMA).
Although the RMA is discussed throughout, the framework will apply to any area
of policy for which devolution decisions are being considered.
The Resource Management Act is based on a very devolved framework.  There
is a role for national government but in practice, most decisions and
implementation occurs at regional and local government level.
Devolution issues are complex and there are seldom ‘pure’ results, particularly
in the case of such a wide-ranging policy area as resource management.  Our
conclusions about the RMA offer a mixture of solutions, from legislative
adjustments to change the level of government, to complementary policies that
support the current structures.
We regulate resource use for a number of reasons.  Where public goods and
commons issues are significant we provide and protect the resource through
regulation.  Where externalities that affect few people are significant, we most
appropriately provide a clear definition of property rights and a process for
negotiation and dispute resolution.  Where there are significant information
failures we might set and enforce national standards, and provide public
education.
The paper accepts that we are going to regulate resource use and focuses on
the issue of how we best achieve this.  In addressing the three devolution
question listed above, the paper divides up analysis into decision making and
cost bearing (section 4), implementation (section 5) and the relationship
between the two (section 6).  What are the criteria for devolution?
Social Decision Making and Cost Bearing
The problem with efficient public good provision is that the government is
unable to reveal private preferences in any exact manner.4
People reveal their preferences through two imperfect mechanisms: voting with
their feet (Tiebout model of mobility) and social choice mechanisms
(involvement in political processes).  We concentrate primarily on social
decision making processes.
Does devolution improve social choice mechanisms and lead to better
preference revelation?  We have identified three principles and criteria for
deciding when devolution of decision making is appropriate.
1 Informed decision-making.
The best decisions reflect all the relevant subjective and objective information.
Those who experience the effects should make the decisions, since it is they
who have subjective preferences about the issue.  People with the skills and
resources to access objective information should also be involved in decision
making.
2 Balanced decision making.
If people within the jurisdiction that makes the decision bear all benefits and
costs, there are no interjurisdictional externalities that could lead to over or
under-provision of the public good.  Decisions should therefore be located,
where possible, with the jurisdiction of effects and costs.  People who make
decisions should be those who receive benefits, and bear costs.
3 Cost effective decision making
Where costs of decision making are high and preferences are relatively
homogeneous, national policies can save considerably on duplication costs.
The location of decision making must be informed by considerations of cost
effectiveness.
The Tiebout model suggests that having multiple jurisdictions is valuable for
better reflecting heterogeneous preferences and improving accountability.  The
possibility of mobility makes it more important to match costs and benefits within
a jurisdiction so that people cannot avoid costs while still receiving benefits by
moving out of the jurisdiction.   Mobility also has implications for the government
role at the local level.  Local governments cannot effectively redistribute income
without inducing out-migration by rich people and in-migration by the poor.
Implementation
We define implementation as activities aimed at achieving non-discretionary
goals set by social decision-makers.  The relative advantage of central versus
local implementers depends heavily on the balance between locally and
centrally held information.  Local government can most easily access local
information, such as monitoring of compliance and knowledge of specialised5
conditions.  General technical information may be most available to central
government.
Economies of scale may lead to implementation being achieved most efficiently
at the central level.  For other activities where flexibility is important, local
implementation may be more effective.
Separability of Implementation from Decision-Making?
How should the contract be written between the political decision-maker and the
implementer if they are not the same?  Clear objectives and lines of
accountability are essential.  However, this can be difficult to achieve in the
case of an arms length contract between central and local government.  The
relative advantages of the different potential decision makers and implementers
should be weighed against the degree of difficulty in contracting before a
decision is made to separate decision-making from implementation.
Accountability of Government
When we have decided the most appropriate political decision maker and
implementer, we need to consider how this fits with the current accountability
structure.  The question is whether local or central government political
structures are more accountable for political decisions.  If, for example, we
consider local government to be less accountable, we may prefer central
implementation despite the other advantages of local government.
Sovereignty
Conversely, in spite of the many arguments in favour of centralised decision
making and implementation we may still bias toward devolving decision making
to local communities if the social importance of local identity and control
outweighs the social choice and efficiency benefits of more centralised control.
Framework for Analysis of Devolution
Figure 1 gives a stylised representation of the different decisions and tradeoffs
discussed above.  The boxes on the right represent the facts relating to a
specific issue, the importance of different types of information and their location.
The ellipses on the left represent decision nodes.  Implementation, political
decisions, and cost bearing can be borne in different “locations”, ie. different
jurisdictions or levels of government.  Matches in terms of location, between
ellipses, and between ellipses and boxes generate benefits, more efficient
implementation, reduced contracting difficulties, more balanced decision
making, and more equitable cost bearing.6



























  Devolution is defined as the transfer of authority from a higher to a lower level of
government.  The objective of this paper is to establish criteria for when this
should occur.  When should we devolve authority to regulate externalities and
public goods from central to local government?
 
  In considering devolution, there are three questions that need to be answered.
 
1.  What level of government should make social and political decisions about
policy objectives?
2.  What level of government should bear the costs of these decisions?
3.  What level of government should implement them?
 
  Devolution of authority must be considered together with arguments for and
against decentralisation of implementation.  Decentralisation can be defined as
the use of a lower level of government as an implementing agent for central
government policy.  In a pure decentralised system, local government merely
carries out the instructions of central government in a non-discretionary way. In
reality these are not usually clearly distinguished.  Nevertheless, they are
conceptually distinct and to understand the optimal allocation of authority and
responsibility and the tradeoffs involved in choosing them, we must keep them
clearly separate in our analysis.
 
  Many past and potential New Zealand reforms involve a combination of
devolution and decentralisation.  In particular the Resource Management Act
(RMA), the health and education reforms, and decisions about the institutions
for addressing Maori issues have led to significant devolution of authority.
Employment policy and social welfare are areas where devolution is an
important policy option.  The role and function of local government is also
inherently an issue of the appropriate level of devolution.  Many of these
reforms have now been in place for a number of years, so it is appropriate to
review our experience of devolution, identify the successes, and attempt to
address the problems that have arisen.
 
  The issues involved in devolution are complex.  Different public good issues
have different characteristics that lead to different optimal policy structures.  A
case by case analysis is required.  Nevertheless, we hope that we are able to
uncover general principles to help guide us in making sensible devolution
decisions.
 
  This paper addresses the issue of devolution both from a general theoretical
standpoint and from the perspective of the New Zealand Resource
Management Act.  Applying theoretical principles in a particular policy context8
throughout the paper helps make the developing framework more concrete and
tests its principles.
 
The Resource Management Act
  The Resource Management Act 1991 is the principal legislation governing the
use of New Zealand’s land, air, water, ecosystems, soils, geology and the built
environment.  It also controls noise, pollution and geothermal activities.  The
RMA integrated resource and environmental management by combining 59
separate statutes.  A fuller description of the major features of the RMA, and
what it replaced, is contained in Appendix One.
 
  The RMA is based on a very devolved framework.  A central underlying
assumption is that governing bodies closest to resources are the most
appropriate to govern the use of those resources.  Although a role for national
government is specified, in practice, most decisions and implementation occur
at the level of regional and local government.  Resource management reform in
New Zealand was related to local government reform.  The Local Government
Act 1989 laid the foundation for the amalgamation of over 800 local authorities,
boards, boroughs etc into the 86 local authorities existing currently.
 
  The RMA has been promoted internationally as a leading example of integrated,
enlightened resource management.  Its structure contrasts significantly with
systems such as that in the United States that combines federal and state, and
with many European systems that are heavily national and to a certain extent
Europe-wide through the EC.1  Understanding the effects of New Zealand's
chosen form of regulation has implications within and beyond New Zealand.
 
  As mentioned above, there are no easy answers to devolution questions.  The
RMA covers such a wide range of issues with different geographical
boundaries, and varying levels of scientific complexity and preference
heterogeneity that we will not emerge with one ‘pure’ result.  New Zealand is a
very small country and cannot hope to perfectly solve each issue separately.
 
  With regard to the RMA, in some cases the current level of devolution, and the
concomitant funding and implementation structures, creates serious problems
that need to be addressed by changing the level of government that addresses
the issue.  However, this paper concludes that the overall institutional structure
is broadly appropriate for core land use, built environment and air and water
quality issues.  In many other cases no optimal, problem-free structure exists, or
that achieving it would damage the cohesion of the overall regulatory structure.
In these cases we can identify the inevitable conflicts and problems and
propose policies complementary to the RMA to encourage the flow of
                                           
1  The US system combines a federal agency, the Environmental Protection Agency, and
national environmental legislation such as the Clean Air Act and Clean Water Act, with
implementation at several levels, state, region, and local community.9
information, skills and resources, reduce duplication of effort, and improve
accountability and cooperation.
 
Aims and structure of this paper
  The paper provides a methodology to analyse devolution, both in the context of
the RMA, and any other devolved areas of government business, actual or
proposed.  The methodology can be used to assess the successes and failures
of devolution to date, to identify options for policy reform and to analyse the
likely effects of any potential policy reforms.
 
Section two of the paper discusses the justification for government’s role in
regulating where there are externalities, public goods and information failures.
For those externalities that government does decide to directly regulate, the
question of how to regulate remains.  Of particular interest in this paper is how
the level of government that makes and implements decisions affects the
choices made, and their efficiency and fairness.
There are three essential issues that have to be confronted in making policy
about the efficient regulation of externalities and public goods.
1.  Social and political decisions need to be made about what society’s
objectives should be.  What is the optimal level of public goods?
2.  Costs need to be borne appropriately.2
3.  Decisions need to be implemented and objectives achieved efficiently.
For each of these functions we need to consider which level of government is
best equipped to carry them out.  Who should make the political decisions?
Who should bear the costs?  Who should implement?
The choice may be between several levels of government – the RMA has roles
for central, regional and district bodies.  Our analysis simplifies this into a
discussion of central vs. local government.  The arguments and principles can
be applied to a more multi-tiered structure because we uncover criteria for
deciding the optimal level of government.
In addressing the three devolution questions listed above, the paper divides
analysis into decision-making and cost bearing, implementation, and then the
relationship between the two.
                                           
2  It is important to mention at the outset that this paper considers cost bearing primarily in
so far as it relates to efficiency of decision-making.  There are many more issues to do
with equitable cost bearing that are important but, although touched upon, are not the
focus of this paper.10
Section 3 discusses political decision-making and cost bearing together.  When
thinking about efficient decision making, cost bearing is a factor that cannot be
separated out, so it is useful to consider them both at once.
Section 4 considers the third of our devolution questions: which level of
government is the most efficient implementer?
In some cases it is difficult to separate political decisions from implementation;
devolution and decentralisation are intrinsically linked.  Section 5 discusses the
problems which arise when there are conflicts between optimal devolution of
decision making and cost bearing and the optimal level of government for
implementation.
As we proceed we will build up a diagram, that represents a framework
summarising the complex interrelations between factors that influence our
decisions.  This framework provides a useful and relatively simple way of
applying our theory of devolution to real RMA situations.
Section 6 deals with accountability and sovereignty issues.  Conclusions and
recommendations follow in section 7.
 
  A companion paper (WP 98/7a) illustrates how the framework applies to an
actual RMA problem.  It deals with significant natural areas and the provision of
kiwi habitat in the Far North.  This draws out issues of balanced social decision-
making and efficient provision when both local and central government input are
essential.
 
  The paper is long.  Readers may wish to be selective in the aspects they read.
The companion paper (WP 98/7a), for example, can be read independently of
the main theoretical section.  We hope that the links between the theory and
companion paper are clear, so the reader who wants more detail on the
concepts used in the case can easily find the relevant theoretical section.11
2 WHY AND WHAT SHOULD WE REGULATE?
The main purpose of this paper is to address questions about how we regulate.
However, before we begin we need to briefly remind ourselves of the reasons
why we regulate at all, and the rationale behind what we decide to control.  A
fuller exposition of these arguments is given in Appendix Two.
“The purpose of this Act is to promote the sustainable management of
natural and physical resources.” (Section 5, RMA 1991)
Why is special legislation needed for the management of natural and physical
resources?
Externalities and Public Goods
The fundamental problem with resources is that many of the property rights are
not fully allocated and enforced. Property rights need to be defined, transferable
and enforceable for efficient markets to function.  Whenever property rights are
incompletely defined or enforced, externalities and public good situations arise
and resources can be allocated inefficiently without intervention.  In addition,
some agents will be able to claim the unallocated resources for their own use.
This is an undemocratic, inequitable way to allocate resources that were
previously held in common.
In many instances private solutions are possible.  The Coase Theorem
suggests that, where transaction costs are low, all that is necessary is for the
State to define and enforce property rights, and negotiation and the common
law system will allocate resources efficiently.  This is a very unintrusive form of
regulation.
Regulation of non-public externalities (e.g.: obstruction of private views) could
be limited to defining property rights and facilitation – also relatively unintrusive.
Local government should be able to facilitate agreements on externalities that
affect very small numbers of people. Their role should be limited to mediation,
and recording and enforcing agreements among affected parties.  Elsewhere
they can reduce transaction costs by certifying the credibility of information, and
providing a forum for discussion.
There are, however, limits to private solutions that call for more invasive
regulation by government.  For which issues are the failures of private solutions
to externalities sufficiently great that further government regulation is needed?
Theory suggests government should focus on regulating externalities that affect
public goods and common property resources, particularly those that have the
following characteristics:
1.   Transaction costs are high due to information asymmetries or costs of
coordination.  This is often the case when an externality affects a large
number of people, comes from several sources, or has effects over a12
number of years.  Air pollution is a good example.  In this situation it is
unreasonable to expect all the affected parties to negotiate successfully.
2.   Property rights can not be allocated or enforced adequately.  Some goods
are inherently difficult to allocate (e.g. fish that migrate).  Some property
rights are difficult to enforce (e.g.; limited liability companies, dealing with
risks of pollution rather than actual pollution, may not take adequate
precautions).
3.    Some interests are not represented.  This occurs with high coordination
costs and large imbalances in resources for negotiation (it is likely to affect
environmental groups, Maori, community groups etc who are negotiating
with business).  Furthermore, future generations are unable to represent
themselves and government may need to act as their agent.
Information failures
Imperfect information about the effects of resource use is another important
market failure in the allocation of resources; it may also warrant government
intervention.
Issues may be new which means that individuals have not developed
experience, and institutions to disseminate information are poorly developed.
Effects may be unobservable, uncertain or occur over a long time frame.
Understanding the effects may require specialised expertise or scientific
knowledge.
There is a role for government regulation in areas where there are critical
information problems.  These could be situations where the potential harm is
great, costs of avoidance are low relative to the harm, and individual information
is poor.
It is reasonably uncontentious that there is a role for government regulation in
some cases of public goods, externalities and information failures.3  Let’s return
to our central concern.  Given that we are going to regulate some goods and
activities, what level of government is best placed to do it?
                                           
3  Much debate rages as to the nature and scope of that role.  Almost everything produces
externalities – smiling, dress sense, old cars on front lawns, aesthetics of buildings.
Which externalities and public goods should the government care about?  How much
regulation should there be?  Where is the limit of government involvement?  It is
important to keep in mind that this is ultimately a political question and the most basic one
that must be decided by whatever level of government makes decisions.  People have
strong and diverse subjective preferences about this. While logic and analysis can clarify
the issues and empirical evidence can inform them, questions about the role of
government are, ultimately, a matter of preferences and judgement, not an objective
issue.13
3 POLITICAL/SOCIAL DECISION MAKING AND COST BEARING4
When the American settlers rose against the British in the War of
Independence, their catch cry was “no taxation without representation”.   One
argument for devolution of resource management is based on a similar concern:
concern that those who are affected, both positively and negatively, by a
regulation are those who are able to control that regulation.  If an activity has
only local effects, there is no call for allowing the preferences of distant actors to
have any play or for forcing them to bear any of the costs.
The Problem with Public Goods: Preference Revelation
The fundamental problem with efficient public good provision is that government
is unable to reveal private preferences for public goods.  The value of many
consumption goods, both public and private, is largely subjective, and
dependent on individual preferences rather than having objective productive
value.  However, in the case of private goods, consumers reveal their private
preferences and marginal valuations through their purchases.  The level and
allocation of private goods is pareto efficient in a well functioning market.  No
equivalent market mechanism exists to provide public goods, which makes it
difficult to decide the efficient level of public goods.  In addition, no market
forces provide incentives for efficient production.
At the optimal level of public good provision, the sum of all marginal valuations
is equal to the marginal cost (Samuelson, 1955).  If individuals’ shares of the
costs of providing a public good are related to their stated valuations, then
individuals have an incentive to understate their marginal valuation.  This occurs
because a decrease in an individual’s stated valuation will have a small impact
on the level of provision.  She will, however, pay a lower share of cost for all
units of the good.  People will choose to understate their valuation and free ride
on other’s contributions (Bergstrom, Blume and Varian, 1986).  In contrast, if
cost shares are not linked to people’s responses, it costs a person nothing to
                                           
4  The arguments outlined in this section all deal with issues of efficiency.  If preferences are
not well represented and/or decisions are unbalanced, there may be opportunities for
pareto improvement.  Cost bearing also has ethical implications although discussion of
distributional issues is outside the scope of this paper.  One point to note for our
purposes, however, is that national government is better at redistribution.  Local
governments cannot redistribute income between or even within the jurisdiction.  National
government could impose high costs on one jurisdiction or group (a minority of any type)
particularly if decision making is unbalanced.  Discussion of this can be found in Appendix
Five.14
overstate their valuations in an attempt to gain more of the public good.  These
forces imply that the costs of providing public goods will not relate closely to the
benefits individuals receive from them.5
Despite these difficulties in making an objective analysis, governments do in
fact have to make decisions about public good provision based on assessments
of this private, subjective information.  This inevitably involves social processes
that are inconsistent, inefficient and possibly unfair.
People can reveal their preferences in two ways:
First, devolution allows people to ‘vote with their feet’.  If bundles of taxes and
public goods vary among jurisdictions, people can reveal their preferences by
choosing where they live.  This form of preference revelation is captured in the
Tiebout Model (Tiebout, 1956).   It is particularly effective for decisions such as
choices of school.  It puts pressure on local authorities to offer public goods
people want and to be efficient.  The mechanism is limited by the costs of
mobility, the limited number of choices available and the many other limitations
on location choice, such as job locations.
The second way people reveal their preferences is through social choice
mechanisms. People express their preferences through voting or direct
involvement in political processes, submissions, lobbying etc.  Lets look first at
these social choice mechanisms before considering under what circumstances
devolution may improve them.
Social Choice Mechanisms
Political or voting mechanisms for choosing levels of public goods are always
imperfect. Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem indicates that no social choice rule
consistently satisfies basic conditions.
Any unweighted voting rule leads to poor social decisions when there are
differences in the intensity of preference.  People with a large stake in the issue
(e.g.: landowners who might have to bear significant costs, or people strongly
affected by pollution) have the same votes as people with little direct interest.
In a system with majority rule, the ‘median voter’ determines the outcome.  If
preferences are not ‘single peaked’, this can lead to particularly poor decisions.
On most issues there is a spectrum of choices about how much of the good to
provide.  If preferences are single peaked, the density function has a single
maximum and the mean, mode and median are reasonably closely related.  On
                                           
5  Some theoretical mechanisms will lead to perfect preference revelation.  These have
problems, however, both theoretically and in reality.  Incentive compatible mechanisms
such as the Clark-Grove mechanism yield revenue that cannot be used without violating
incentive compatibility.  They are also vulnerable to manipulation (Tidemann and Tullock).
On the practical side, because of their complexity, they are infeasible for large groups or
large numbers of issues.15
some issues, however, voter preferences are likely to be double peaked.  One
group of people will prefer a low level of provision and another will prefer a high
level.  Few people want an intermediate level but this is the level that is chosen
in a majority vote.
Figure 2  Single and Double Peaked Preference Density Functions
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An individual could also have double-peaked preferences.  An example may be
sewage control in a city.  If sewage is poorly treated, people simply don’t use
the beach.  Mediocre control has some cost but is insufficient to allow beach
use so is of no value to many people.  However, excellent sewage treatment
would allow full use of the coast so people would value it.  An individual would
either prefer no sewerage control, or very good control.  Mediocre control,
however, is the level that will be chosen in a majority vote.  In cases with double
peaked preferences, majority voting may lead to an outcome that no one wants.
Another common problem with majority voting is that where ‘voting cycles’ exist
(no one option is preferred by a majority to all others in pairwise votes), the
outcome in a series of votes may depend on the order in which voting occurs.
This means that whoever sets the agenda has considerable power.
In reality we do not vote on every issue.  We vote for agents who make the
detailed decisions on our behalf.  When there is a wide range of issues, any
agent is unlikely to truly represent any individual’s basket of preferences let
alone the preferences of society as a whole.  In a large jurisdiction, each vote
has little impact.16
Social choice is clearly an inexact process.  The key issue of relevance to this
paper is whether devolution improves social choice mechanisms and leads to
better preference revelation.
When does Devolution Improve Social Choice?
Will devolution mean that individual preferences are better reflected in
decisions?  The answer is not simple.  Sometimes local government is a better
decision-maker; sometimes central government is.  It depends on the details of
the issue under consideration.  What the following sub-sections aim to uncover
are the criteria that it depends on.  What are the principles for social choice
mechanisms working well?
We have identified three principles for efficient decision making:
1 Informed decision making
The best decisions reflect all the relevant objective and subjective
information.
2 Balanced decision making
The best decisions take into account costs and benefits.
3 Cost effectiveness
Duplication should be avoided where decision-making costs are high and
preferences are homogeneous.
Informed decision making
Good decisions reflect all the relevant objective and subjective information.
People reveal their subjective preferences by participating in the political
processes in their jurisdictions.  If decisions are made by jurisdictions that do
not include all affected people, there is no mechanism for the affected people
outside the jurisdiction to reveal their preferences.  Thus, when the jurisdiction
is smaller than the area of the externalities, even with benign political
processes, not all preferences will be reflected in decisions.
The importance of subjective preferences in making efficient decisions depends
on the nature of the issue.  In some issues most benefits are subjective, for
example, the number of trees in an area, preservation of the historic character
of an area.  Preferences on these issues are likely to be very heterogeneous.
In other issues, the benefits are more objective, for example, health effects from
local air pollution.  Educated preferences on these issues are likely to be more
homogeneous.
If the decision-making jurisdiction is larger than the area where effects are felt,
preferences can be revealed but other problems arise.  If central government
makes policy it tends to have one policy, which applies to the entire country17
even where multiple policies are possible.  For perceived equity reasons, it is
difficult for central government to differentiate policies.  It would be even more
difficult for central government to tax differently in different areas.  People would
not make a clear connection between the variance in tax and the variance in
regulations and public services. Central government has a heterogeneous
constituency, so if preferences are also heterogeneous, few people will be
highly satisfied by the level of public good chosen.
As jurisdictions become geographically smaller, the constituency will tend to
become more homogeneous so that the outcome converges toward the
interests of each individual. In situations where distinct groups have strong
preferences, it may make sense to design the jurisdiction around this group to
minimise internal heterogeneity. (Olson, 1980)  For example, iwi could be
argued to have distinct preferences for resource management that suggests
separate iwi authorities on some issues. With local government the connection
between rates, regulation and services is transparent.  If preferences for
regulation and public services are very heterogeneous among local jurisdictions
a national policy will be much less efficient than a multitude of local policies.
Many decisions also involve objective facts and complex processes.  In these
cases, if decisions are made without access to good objective information and
skills for analysing complex processes, results may be poor.  If decision-makers
realise their lack of information, they may seek it from elsewhere. Frequently,
however, they may not be aware of the information and skills needed, or be
able to contract for it effectively.  Effective contracting for advice requires some
understanding of the nature of advice required, and an ability to assess the
quality of information received.
In reflecting all the relevant information, then, it is important to consider the
following:
·  Where is the subjective information held?  This will require determining
where the effects are felt, since it is those affected that will have subjective
preferences.  Are these preferences relatively homogenous or extremely
varied?
·  Where is the objective information held?  How easily can it be transferred?
·  What is the relative importance of subjective and objective information?
As a general principle, decision making should rest with the level of government
that can access the greatest amount of relevant information.
Balanced decision making
When public goods are provided out of tax revenue, the concern that those who
are affected by a regulation also control it is expressed as Fiscal Equivalence,
“a match between those who receive the benefits of a collective good and those18
who pay for it”.6   Decisions can be inefficient when the costs are borne by
either a larger group than receive the benefits, or a smaller group.
Within Jurisdictions
One specific public choice problem in the RMA, is that the primary method of
provision of public goods, and prevention of externalities, is regulation.
Purchase of the public good is not generally an option.  Therefore all costs are
borne by land/resource owners, not shared across the jurisdiction.  This leads to
over-provision in a democracy because government (taxpayers) do not bear the
costs of their decisions (Epstein, 1995).  After the regulation has been imposed,
the land will be used in a constrained efficient way.7
The public choice and efficiency problems created by uneven cost bearing
within a jurisdiction are probably lessened by devolution because the afflicted
agent is ‘larger’, in a political sense, in a local jurisdiction that in central
government.  Because agents are more homogeneous in a smaller jurisdiction,
those who are forced to provide the public good will be a larger percentage of
the population on each issue. On the other hand, in central government, similar
situations will occur frequently so there may be more pressure to have fair,
consistent decisions.
Between Jurisdictions: Interjurisdictional Externalities
The same public choice problems that occur within a jurisdiction will occur
between jurisdictions if the costs and benefits are not borne/received by the
same people. Any form of devolution leads to a limited number of government
bodies, each of which deals with a range of issues and a fixed geographical
area.  In New Zealand 74 territorial local authorities and 12 regional authorities
cover resource management issues in their jurisdictions.  This means that for
almost every individual issue there is a mismatch between the jurisdiction and
the spatial distribution of the effects.  When the jurisdiction is smaller than the
area affected an interjurisdictional externality is created.
Sources of Interjurisdictional Externalities
Environmental externalities
The most obvious externality is where an environmental benefit or harm goes
beyond the jurisdiction.  E.g.: nation-wide benefits from biodiversity protection.
                                           
6  Olson, 1980 p. 30
7  However, uncertainty about the possibility of future takings can lead to significant
distortions in behaviour.  For example, a landowner who discovers a large stand of rimu
on his property would not want to notify the government, because he may be constrained
from felling it.  If he thinks government will discover it, he will fell it quickly before a
regulation can be imposed, even if he would not have chosen to in the absence of
regulation.19
Decision-makers will tend to under-supply the environmental benefit because all
the costs are borne inside the jurisdiction, but only the fraction of the benefits
received within the jurisdiction will be taken into account.  The decision-makers
will allow over-production of polluting activities, because the benefits from the
polluting activity are contained inside while some of the harm is suffered
outside.
Network extemalities
A network externality arises when adding another agent to the network not only
provides service to the agent added but also improves services to all others in
the network.  For example, providing telephone service to another community
helps those in that community and also benefits others who want to
communicate with them.  Extending a network may also lower the costs of the
next extension.  If linking decisions are all made separately they may not be
individually rational even if they would be jointly efficient.  If some agents
provide significant network externalities because of critical location or size of
population it may be worth subsidising their connection.  Conversely, they may
want to exploit their position of strength to extract the value of those
externalities.  The transaction costs of coordinating a network may be high
enough to justify central control on network issues.
Pecuniary externalities
A decision within a jurisdiction may restrict resource use in such a way that it
diminishes the opportunities for capital and labour looking to migrate into the
jurisdiction.  It is sometimes argued that strong regulation disadvantages
businesses that wish to locate in an area, and therefore it should be
constrained.
There are externalities from the decision but they are “pecuniary externalities”.
Pecuniary externalities are simply the operation of the price system; they are an
efficient part of the market’s response to scarcity.  Assuming there are no other
interjurisdictional externalities, and the public choice mechanism operates
effectively, these decisions are disappointing for agents who would like to use
the resources, but not inefficient.  If people wish to constrain the use of their
own resources they should be allowed to. The jurisdiction is deciding to use the
scarce resources for conservation or local public goods rather than gaining their
commercial value.
This needs to be distinguished however from the use of the RMA by existing
businesses to prevent entry by competitors on the ground that the entrants will
lower the profits of existing businesses.  The adverse effects of the entrants on
the local businesses is merely the operation of the market, these adverse
effects will be offset by gains to local consumers and workers.  Use of
regulation to prevent entry occurs only because of failures in the local social
choice mechanism.  There is no role for government intervention on the
grounds of pecuniary externalities.  However, if regulation to address public20
goods problems creates a pecuniary externality as a side effect this is not
inefficient.
Other, more subtle instances of externalities between jurisdictions include tax
externalities, deleterious interjurisdictional competition and the “not in my
backyard” or NIMBY phenomenon.  These are discussed in Appendix Four:
Other Externalities.  Risk sharing is another form of cost bearing.  The optimal
allocation of risk in regulation is discussed in Appendix Six:  Risk Bearing.
Balanced efficient decisions occur when decisions, costs and benefits are all
located in the same jurisdiction.  When benefits and decision making have the
same jurisdiction but this jurisdiction is mismatched with the cost bearing
jurisdiction, fiscal externalities occur; when decision making and cost bearing
have the same jurisdiction but this jurisdiction is mismatched with the benefit
jurisdiction, environmental externalities occur.  Externalities of either type lead
to unbalanced decisions.  Matching the level of decisions to the level of benefits
allows appropriate diversity in policies; it permits heterogeneous local policies
where applicable and avoids them where they are inappropriate. Table 1
summarises the effects of mismatches.
Table 1  Social Choice and Devolution
Local Decisions Benefits
Local National











   













If the benefits are received by a larger group than the decision makers, and
costs are borne by the decision-making group, public goods will tend to be
under-provided (row one, right column).  Where the same or similar externalities
are produced in every jurisdiction, however, local authorities may cooperate to
all increase/reduce externalities to the efficient level.  This especially occurs21
where they see it as a repeated situation.  They may believe that if they behave
cooperatively this period, others will reciprocate in the next.
Another clear source of poor decision making arises when the decision making
group is able to impose part or all of the costs on another group (row two).  If
the costs are borne by a larger group than the decision-makers (e.g.: local
decision making but national cost bearing), and the benefits from the public
good are primarily local, public goods will tend to be over-provided.  The
government is not accountable to its “taxpayers”.  If benefits are also national,
the decision will only reflect local interests and the decision will be inefficient but
not systematically biased.
National Decisions
Consider the contrasting case, where central government determines a policy
for the benefit of the nation, and then requires local government to implement it
and bear the costs (row three, right column).  This situation is referred to as an
‘unfunded mandate’.  Unfunded mandates can lead to inequitable cost bearing,
and inefficient financing.8  Although all affected agents are located in the central
government jurisdiction, costs are borne by a minority so public choice is
unbalanced.  Public goods will tend to be overproduced.
If the decision making jurisdiction is larger than the area of the effects, and
costs are shared throughout the jurisdiction, those outside the area will lose
from a provision to address the externality that involves public expenditure (row
four, left column).  Representatives of these outsiders will vote against the
provision, unless regulators make deals across areas so all locally efficient
outcomes are supported.9  In addition, voters with little direct interest in an issue
may seek to impose their preferences on other groups and areas, particularly
where they bear no direct cost.
To summarise, balanced decisions require that those that make the decisions
are those that receive the benefits and bear the costs.  This avoids
interjurisdictional externalities that could lead to under or overprovision of the
good.  There may still be uneven cost bearing within a jurisdiction.
In considering whether to devolve decision making the following questions need
to be considered:
·  Where are the benefits/effects felt?
·  Who bears the costs currently?  Is it the same area that receives the
benefits?  Where could costs more appropriately be borne?
                                           
8  An example of this arises in the case of significant natural areas in Northland.  See Case
Study II.
9 Olson,  198022
Cost effective decision making
One national policy requires only one decision-making process, so if the costs
of decision making are high, national policies save considerably by cutting out
duplication.  Costs will be especially high where issues are publicly very
contentious or involve complex information and analysis.
Even if national decision making is more expensive, a national decision only
needs to be made once, while a regional decision must be made 16 times and a
territorial local authority decision must be made 78 times.  If preferences are
nationally homogeneous, e.g.: an issue such as drinking-water quality
standards, this duplication is wasteful even if each jurisdiction makes an
appropriate decision.  In contrast, making multiple decisions on whether to
constrain the style of residential development, and if so how, is expensive but
worthwhile if preferences vary significantly among jurisdictions.  One national
decision will lead to poor representation of preferences.
The following are central in assessing whether cost effectiveness issues will
form part of the decision of whether to devolve decision-making:
·  Is the cost of decision making high?
·  Is there homogeneity or heterogeneity of preferences?
·  If there are high costs and heterogeneous preferences, how do we trade
these two off?  i.e.: how do we assess which point on the graph we are at?23
A case study that highlights these issues is that of cell phone tower placement.
EXAMPLE:  THE PLACEMENT OF CELL PHONE TOWERS
The placement of cell phone towers in the community has been a controversial issue
over the last couple of years.  Many members of the public have perceived the level of
health risk imposed by these towers to be significant.  However, The weight of scientific
opinion is that the risk of health problems occurring as a result of exposure to
radiofrequency fields complying with the New Zealand standard is negligible10.
Telecommunications companies that wish to place a cell site in a community are
required to apply for a resource consent from the local authority. Any member of the
public can make a submission on a provision of a district or regional plan dealing with
cell phone towers or on any particular cell phone tower resource consent application.
Consents can also be appealed to the Environment Court. The public concern
regarding perceived health risks has manifested itself in continued submissions
opposing the granting of resource consents for cell sites and a number of petitions to
the Environment Court.
The judgement that needs to be made in this case study is the weighting which should
be placed on ensuring that local preferences are included in the decision making
process, based on the costs and benefits of their inclusion.  The benefit of considering
local preferences is that the resulting regional standard is more likely to be a genuine
reflection of the preferences of the members of that community.  The costs of
considering local preferences are that an issue has to be considered many times,
multiplying decision-making costs. Figure xxx illustrates the nature of this trade-off.
On Figure xxx, we have indicated that the issue of cell sites could be placed on the left
end of the spectrum for heterogeneity of preferences.  This represents the judgement
that, if people are exposed to the relevant objective information on the health risks of
cell-sites, there is likely to be a low level of variance across communities for the levels
of risk from radiofrequency exposure that people are willing to accept.
Figure xxx also shows that there are high fixed costs of local decision-making.  These
are costs to the applicant in defending each individual cell-site application, and
administrative costs for each separate local authority, and for the Environment Court
when local decisions are appealed.
                                           
10  Cell sites generate a radiofrequency field.  At very high levels of exposure to these fields,
adverse effects on humans have been observed.  The New Zealand voluntary standard,
produced by Standards New Zealand, recommends that exposure limits for the public
should be at least fifty times lower than the levels at which adverse effects have been
identified and cell sites operate at levels of only a few percent of the limits stated in the
standard.24
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The low level of heterogeneity means that any welfare costs generated by imposing
one decision on a range of different communities is low.  Meanwhile national decision
making greatly reduces the administration costs of repetitive decision making.
Therefore our view is that decisions on the health effects of cell phone tower
placements should be made at the national level.
The RMA does provide for national policy setting.  Central government can make
national policy statements (sec 45-55) or set national environmental standards (sec 43)
requiring local government to deal with this issue in a certain fashion.
The likelihood that individuals are not accurately estimating the level of risk involved
indicates that information campaigns or guidelines may be valuable to ensure that
individuals’ preferences are based on full information.  Better information may lead to a
decrease in the propensity of people to continually oppose resource consents.25
The Framework: Political Decision Making and Cost Bearing
Figure 3 offers a framework that summarises the key points from the previous
discussion.  The framework can be used in two basic ways: to understand
problems in current government structures, and to predict the benefits and
drawbacks of options for reform.
Figure 3: Devolution and Political Decision Making
Benefits
Political













and Skills Informed decision making
  The boxes on the right represent factual characteristics about the issue of
concern - their locations are given.  The oval bubbles on the left represent
decisions to be made - their locations are choices that we must make.  Matches
between the location of boxes or bubbles indicate elements of efficiency in
social decision making.  Mismatches represent problems that are likely to arise
and need to be addressed.  We’ll use the example of subdivision to illustrate the
way the diagram works.
Illustration:  Social choices about Subdivision and Local Land Use
To analyse a particular issue, we first need to identify the community that
directly benefits from regulation.  In the case of the subdivision question, this is
the owners of the land that borders the proposed subdivision and the local
neighbourhood, and to a lesser extent the city where the subdivision is located.
The people in these areas will have unobservable subjective preferences about
the value of the benefits of the regulation. People care about the physical
effects and have views about the appropriate definition of property rights.  Some
people believe communities have significant rights to control private land use26
because it affects the community as a whole, whereas others believe in the
predominance of private property rights.  For issues such as subdivision these
preferences are critical information for good decision making.  For other issues
they may be less important.
The other characteristic we need to determine is the location and importance of
observable, objective information.  In the case of subdivision, objective
information, such as knowledge about road design, siltation problems, drainage
and so on, is available locally because of local experience but also could be
gained at the national level.11  In any case, for this issue the critical information
is the local people’s preferences about the nature of the community they live in.
Once we have established the nature and location of the fixed aspects of the
subdivision issue we can turn our attention to the variable elements.  The
bubbles indicate the ‘location’ of political decision-making and cost bearing.  In
the case of subdivision under the RMA, both political decisions and costs are
local.  Given that benefits are local, and subjective information is more difficult
to obtain than objective for this issue, the institutional structure is well aligned.12
Matches or links between the loci, boxes and bubbles, bring improvements in
the efficiency of social decision making.  In the case of subdivision, where
benefits, costs and decisions match, preferences will be represented, and
decision making will be relatively balanced.  There are few interjurisdictional
externalities, and the neighbourhood bears all costs.  If citizens think decisions
are poor, they can vote against council members or be more directly involved in
influencing local policy.
It is possible that the jurisdiction for subdivision is still too large although people
throughout the Territorial Local Authority (TLA) could be argued to have a
legitimate interest.  Relatively uninterested parties may seek to impose their
preferences on those directly affected.  Ideally, in this case, the TLA will
primarily act as a facilitator for neighbourhood decision-making on issues with
very small externality boundaries such as fences, house colour and distance
from boundary.
The diagram only captures two of the three criteria for good decision making.
One remaining issue that must be considered is whether the costs of duplicating
objective information outweigh the benefits that arise through local control of a
local issue.  In this case they don’t.  Subjective preferences are very important
                                           
11  A contrasting example would be deciding appropriate levels of drinking water treatment.
Here knowledge about the costs and physical effects of different systems is more
important than variance in preferences about water quality.  Preferences are probably
fairly homogeneous.
12  In the case of drinking water quality, benefits are at the regional level and objective
information is critical.  Under the RMA, regional councils make decisions about drinking
water provision.  Regional council boundaries roughly match watersheds.  Water users
and ratepayers bear costs.  Again, decisions, benefits and costs are aligned.27
and likely to be extremely heterogeneous, so any advantage of lack of
duplication through one decision being made centrally is likely to be outweighed
by the advantages of maximising preference revelation through localised
decision making.
Mobility and Devolution
Mobility has some positive effects on the efficiency of public good provision.
When there are multiple jurisdictions offering a range of packages of
taxation/regulation and public services, a pseudo market emerges.  People will
reveal their preferences for public goods by choosing the jurisdiction in which
they live.  More jurisdictions imply greater choice and more competition to
provide both the packages people prefer and to provide services in an efficient
way.  The Tiebout model, which formalises the operation of this pseudo market,
is discussed in more detail in Appendix Three.
New Zealanders are a relatively mobile people.  Between 1991 and 1996, 24%
of New Zealanders chose a new jurisdiction to live in.  Different TLAs do have
different “cultures” to a certain extent, e.g.: Waitakere City and Manukau City
have very different characters, so people have some choice.  Although location
decisions are heavily dependent on job opportunities, this mobility still allows
some preference revelation and puts some pressure on local jurisdictions.
Mobility also causes some significant problems with regulation. Any
interjurisdictional externalities are exacerbated when people can move away
from the areas bearing costs and into the areas receiving benefits.  Decision-
making is not only unbalanced, but can also lead to unstable communities.  We
probably do not want to directly restrict mobility on the basis of these problems,
but we do want to be aware of them to understand the detrimental side effects
of certain policies.
Mobility limits the ability of local governments to redistribute income either
directly or through services.  A jurisdiction that redistributes from high income to
low income will tend to lose high-income people and gain low-income people.
As they lose the high income, high tax paying people they become unable to
support their previous level of service provision.  It also becomes more difficult
to support diverse communities.
When economies of scale in public good provision exist, small communities
may suffer from out migration because of tax externalities.  A person leaving a
small community lowers the cost of public services by less than the loss of
revenue.  Thus the migrant imposes an externality on the remaining community.
Conversely, where diseconomies of scale arise in large communities, a person
entering a large community may increase that community’s tax take by less
than the cost of providing additional services.  This problem could be addressed
by making communities more similar in size to make best use of any economies
of scale and avoid diseconomies.  Alternatively larger communities may want to28
subsidise small communities, or tax new development in large cities to prevent
inefficient migration toward overcrowded cities.
Thus mobility complements devolution by improving preference revelation, but
also makes appropriate handling of interjurisdictional issues and redistribution
critical.  Institutional structures need to take into account the dynamic impact of
mobility.29
4 IMPLEMENTATION
We have considered social decision making and efficient cost bearing together.
Implementation is the third function for which decisions about level of
government need to be made.
We define implementation to be the activities to achieve non-discretionary goals
set by social decision-makers.  Implementers may need to make decisions
about the most efficient approach to achieve the goals but these decisions will
be based purely on objective criteria, not preferences.  If society has
preferences about the type of instruments used to achieve outcomes, these
should be specified as part of the goals given to the implementers.
In common parlance ‘implementation’ usually combines objective decisions and
some subjective decisions, but separating the two roles makes analysis clearer.
Even if central government made the key decisions about objectives there might
be reasons why you would want to devolve choices about how to get there.  In
this situation two types of social decisions must be made.  First the macro
decisions about environmental outcomes, and second the micro outcomes
about regulatory instruments and local cost sharing.  Different levels of
government may make these.  In our analysis these should be looked at as two
distinct social decisions and separated from the actual implementation of the
regulatory instruments once the social decisions are made.
If central government implements its own decisions it could use a series of local
agencies.  For example, although the Department of Social Welfare has local
offices, they are controlled under centralised policies.  In contrast, where central
government decides to decentralise implementation it can write contracts with
local providers.  For example the national government contracts with hospitals
to carry out certain numbers of heart operations.  The hospitals decide how to
do the operations and run the cardiac unit but do not decide how many patients
to operate on or which patients to choose.
If the national government issues a national policy statement, it mandates local
government to carry out this mandate.  National government sets the objectives
and local government implements them.  If the local government wants to use
national government services and skills to implement its own policies, it writes a
contract with the appropriate national government agency.  When local
government makes and implements decisions the two roles may be
indistinguishable.
Under the RMA, local government is providing a process for public participation
and mediation, regulatory decision making (i.e.: plans), and implementation of
regulations through decisions in individual situations (for example: resource
consents).  Government’s other role in the RMA is the collection, analysis and
provision of information.  The appropriate level of government for this function is
discussed in Appendix Seven.30
Local government may regulate externalities and provide public goods more
efficiently than central government or less efficiently.  Its relative efficiency
varies by issue and depends on the location of relevant information, the skills
and resources of each body, and the potential for co-ordination of local and
central information and decisions.  As in the previous section, we are looking for
criteria or principles that will help guide the decision about the most appropriate
level of implementation.
Let’s look at what theory might say about which level of government is the most
efficient implementer.  We have identified three criteria or principles to guide
implementation location decisions.
1 Diseconomies of scale: flexibility
Where local circumstances are diverse, the best implementation will tailor
diverse solutions.
2 Economies of scale: efficiency
Economies can arise through providing more of a given good or avoiding
duplication of objective decisions.
3 Information
Implementers need to access the relevant information about local
conditions and actions and technical/scientific aspects of the issue.
4  Innovation
New ideas can occur anywhere, but the skills to develop them and
resources to diffuse them may be more available nationally.
When flexible policies are optimal, or if good local information is essential to
efficient implementation, local implementation will tend to be more efficient.
However economies of scale regarding specialist skills, operational capabilities
and information create a case for centralised implementation.  Who the best
implementer will be will vary case by case depending on the trade-off among
these considerations.  In some instances the advantages of bigger size will be
more crucial.  In others access to local info and flexible local solutions will be
more pertinent.
Diseconomies of scale: flexibility
The RMA focuses on outcomes rather than fixing rules.  This flexibility, where a
range of behaviours may all achieve the desired objective, is crucial.  It allows
tailor made solutions to local conditions.  Local government may be able to
achieve desired outcomes in a more flexible way.  If there are diseconomies of
scale in the number of different decisions an authority must make, a smaller
jurisdiction, which deals with fewer situations, can make more diverse decisions
on those situations.  A larger authority may resort to fixed rules that cover a
range of situations.  More diverse decisions allow focus on achieving given31
environmental outcomes rather than fixing rules for the way those outcomes are
achieved.
Of course the price of flexibility can be uncertainty for businesses and
individuals about how regulations will affect them.  This uncertainty could be
dealt with by working out solutions to all future situations in advance.  This is
extremely costly.  Solutions must be negotiated for situations that may not occur
for many years if at all.13  Alternatively the jurisdiction can set up some general
guidelines in advance to reduce uncertainty but then deal with individual
situations as they arise.  This saves up-front costs but does leave some
uncertainty and scope for strategic behaviour to alter future decisions.14
Diseconomies of scale in the organisation of decision-making processes may
also arise if bureaucracies get beyond some critical size.  Small jurisdictions
may be more flexible and less bureaucratic.
Economies of scale: efficiency
As was the case with cost-effective decision making, to the extent that problems
and situations repeat, central implementation benefits from economies of scale.
This is particularly true where decisions are heavily based on objective rather
than subjective factors.  For example, hazardous waste management, such as
the appropriate design of landfills, is a problem in all jurisdictions.  This is not an
area with large differences in preferences.  No one wants to be exposed to
dangerous chemicals when they can fairly cheaply avoid it.  Designing
appropriate rules for landfill design does, however, require a high level of
technical information and skill.  Having one set of rules on storage of hazardous
waste avoids unnecessary duplication.  In cases like these, decisions and
implementation are best carried out centrally.
Economies rather than diseconomies of scale may exist for provision of some
public goods.  For example, in Auckland, sewage management, landfills, and
transportation management, are all more efficiently provided at a regional scale
rather than very locally.  However, we can only exploit economies of scale if the
jurisdiction that provides the good can be expanded without violating fiscal
equivalence. (Olson, 1980)  Sewage treatment in a sparsely populated region
will not necessarily be made more efficient by combining that region with
another.  Sewage still needs to be treated close to its source.
Some regulatory instruments may be only available to central government.  This
could be because of links to other central government institutions; for example
                                           
13  This is the route Northland chose with its plan for Significant Natural Areas.  See Case
Study II.
14  In the economics literature this is referred to as an incomplete contract.  One key problem
which arises is “hold up”, where the investments, or information revelation of one party
reduce their bargaining power in future negotiations.32
central government could implement environmental taxes through the existing
tax structure.  Arbitrage can limit the use of some instruments at a local level.
For example, a petrol tax in region will be ineffective if people are easily able to
drive to the neighbouring jurisdiction to buy petrol.  In a different example, local
governments cannot effectively regulate transportation of hazardous waste
because many jurisdictions are affected by one load.  The obvious monitoring
points are at the points of loading and unloading which could be in different
jurisdictions.
Thus in some situations central government has capabilities that offset their lack
of flexibility and larger bureaucracy.
Information
Objective information includes both specialist scientific and technical knowledge
as well as monitoring information about what the physical effects of the
regulation at issue are.
Local regulators are likely to have better access to local information relevant to
efficient implementation.  They can better access local objective information
about physical effect.  Local actors may also be more likely to reveal their
information to a local regulator whose decisions they can influence, rather than
a distant central government.  Local decision-makers may directly observe local
information and actions and therefore obtain monitoring information more
effectively.  Their good local information may enable local decision-makers to
tailor solutions to problems effectively and at low cost, and to enforce these
solutions.
On the other hand, centralising control has advantages.  Central decision-
makers benefit from economies of scale in information, such as scientific
knowledge, that is relevant to a range of similar problems.  They can also
employ people with specialised skills, e.g.: understanding of RMA legislation
and its intent.
Innovation
Innovation is also important to consider when thinking about which level of
government should implement.  In the medium to long run, the ability and
incentives of local and central governments to be dynamically efficient may be
as significant as the static differences.
‘Technology change’, or change in policies used, consists of innovation or
invention, followed by initial adoption (application to a real problem) and then
diffusion to similar problems in different organisations.  Efficient execution of
each of these steps requires appropriate skills and aligned incentives.  The
development and diffusion of new policy approaches suffers from the same
market failures as any other form of research and development.  The new
knowledge is a public good.  The inventor cannot reap all the benefits of his33
activity so has diminished incentives.  Although society wants to encourage
innovation by improving these incentives, once an innovation is created society
wants to charge nothing for its diffusion.
Effective innovation requires high levels of capability but may not intrinsically
require scale.  Small units may be innovative and free to experiment with low
aggregate risk.  If small units do experiment and discover effective new
regulatory techniques, communication between units is essential for effective
learning.  On the other hand, the Schumpeter hypothesis suggests that large
monopolies (and hence large governmental units) are most likely to be
innovative because of their supernormal profitability, and ability to capture the
benefits internally.  Empirical evidence on this is mixed15.
Adoption and diffusion may be more effective in larger governments.  Empirical
evidence suggests that small companies (and hence small jurisdictions?) are
less likely to adopt new technologies.16  This is probably due to lack of technical
capacity, higher risk aversion in small companies, lower profitability of a given
innovation because of smaller scale, and possibly lack of access to the
necessary capital.  Although this literature has developed in the context of
private sector activities, many of the lessons probably also apply to government.
Central government may have more capability and incentive to innovate and
diffuse new ideas, but may not want to experiment on a nationwide scale
because of the large risks.  Maybe an appropriate compromise is for central
government to facilitate experimentation at the local level.  One example where
this has occurred is with the development of tradeable water markets in
Taranaki where a number of central government officials have provided
assistance in the design of a locally administered system which is seen as a
pilot for possible broader implementation.17  Diffusion of new ideas may
similarly need to be motivated and assisted from the centre.
In conclusion, national government may have advantages in funding and
providing the skills for innovation and diffusion of new ideas but may want to
facilitate experimentation at a local level rather than risking applying a new
untested idea to the whole country at once.  Where policies must be locally
differentiated, the national government cannot effectively innovate but may still
have a role in facilitating local innovation.
                                           
15  For discussion and empirical evidence on the Schumpeter Hypothesis, see Cohen and
Levin, in the Handbook of Industrial Organisation (1989).  For discussion on the relative
timing of innovation, adoption and diffusion across different firms within an industry see
Reinganum, in the Handbook of Industrial Organisation (1989).
16  For details on the empirical literature see Karshenas and Stoneman (1995).
17  Personal Communication with Ross Phillipson, NZ Treasury.34
The Framework: Efficient Implementation
The appropriate level of implementation and provision of public goods depends
on the need for diverse solutions across jurisdictions and the extent of
economies of scale in the specific output. It also depends on the need for and
location of objective information, skills, and resources, the importance of locally
observable information, and the ability to access the skills and resources held
by others. The importance of these factors will vary from issue to issue.
Figure 4 illustrates the important linkages for efficient provision.  This is the
second half of the devolution framework.  The boxes again represent the fixed
characteristics of an issue, while the bubbles represent institutional choices.










Let’s continue with the subdivision example.  To implement subdivision
decisions, objective information is important for good design.  Most local
governments have access to this information because subdivision control is one
of their core functions.  Local information, such as on specialised land
conditions, is necessary for appropriate design of regulation to deal with
environmental effects.  Local officials have relatively easy access to this
information and have experience with dealing with similar land nearby.
Monitoring information, to ensure that developers have followed the regulations,
is essential to good enforcement.  Because local conditions and social
decisions are widely varied, the flexibility to match subdivision designs to
specific situations rather than using broad rules is valuable.  In this case the
local advantages clearly outweigh what national advantages may exist in
implementation.18
However, to the extent that experimentation with new subdivision designs, or
new procedures for processing applications, for example to allow more flexibility
and more rapid resolution, are important, national government facilitation may
be valuable.  Even if a local government does successfully innovate, they will
                                           
18  A contrasting case is given in Case Study II where local governments are trying to protect
kiwi habitat.35
not easily transfer their experience to other local governments.  In particular, the
national level government may have backed too far out of the implementation of
the new mandate for outcomes based rather than rules based regulation.  Local
governments are having trouble developing and adopting new practices.
For many issues, both local and central involvement in implementation would be
optimal.  This requires good co-ordination, regardless of where final
accountability lies.  The agent chosen to be ultimately responsible for
implementation should be the one with the most advantages, and/or the ability
to contract for the other’s skills.  Whatever we choose, the most important thing
is to make one agent ultimately accountable so that incentives are clear.  This
avoids the ‘team’ problem where no agent is fully in control, and hence no agent
is fully accountable.
Unfortunately, it is not always possible to separate the level of provision from
the level of political decision making.  A trade-off frequently exists between the
desire for efficient provision and the desire for local control.  In some cases, it
would seem that one level of government should make political decisions and
another should implement them.  Can political accountability and accountability
for efficient implementation be separated?36
5 CAN WE SEPARATE DECISION MAKING FROM IMPLEMENTATION?
We have now considered the appropriate level of government separately taking
into account the desire for balanced effective social decision making, and the
desire for efficient implementation.  In some situations these two objectives will
lead to choices which are in harmony.  In the case of subdivision, both social
decision-making concerns and implementation suggest that local government
should make decisions about regulation.  In other cases conflicts arise and we
would like to have one level of government make decisions and another
implement them.  For example, national government may want to set minimum
air quality standards, but local governments are able to use a variety of
instruments to effectively implement them where problems arise.  Separating
these two roles requires some form of contract between the agents.
A contract specifies what the ‘principal’ wants the agent to do, and how they will
be rewarded and/or punished in relation to this.   In the RMA, two scenarios
arise, the principal is central government and the agent is local, or vice versa.
An example of the first arises in companion paper WP 98/7a where local
government is providing kiwi habitat, a national public good.  An example of the
second is allocation of water rights through a tradeable water rights regime,
where local government makes decisions but needs central assistance through
changes in legislation and technical support.  In most contracts the rewards are
financial.  In the RMA, most are more amorphous.  They could be moral or
financial support for the local jurisdiction, better relationships among agencies,
or legal sanctions through the Environment Court if the contract goals are not
met.
The rules of good contract design apply to contracts between levels of
government.  Clear objectives and lines of accountability are essential.  If they
are unclear, it is impossible to effectively reward and punish.
Contracting problems
Three basic problems arise in contracts:
·  private information about cost and quality
·  private information about effort to achieve goals effectively
·  limitations on rewards and punishments.
If the agent can observe costs or quality and the principal cannot, i.e. adverse
selection, the principal may reward more than necessary or set punishments
inappropriately low and end up with an inferior product.  Cost may be higher
and performance lower.  For example, suppose central government pays local
government to protect kiwi habitat.  It may not know how much farmers really
need to be paid to restrict their land use, or how much local people politically
oppose (and therefore raise the political cost of) land use restrictions.  Central
government may not be able to observe the quality of habitat chosen for37
protection.  This is a particularly visible problem when the agent is paid to carry
out the tasks.
If the agent can observe the care with which decisions are made, and the effort
put into implementing them while the principal cannot, i.e. moral hazard, it is
difficult to provide appropriate incentives for effort.  For example, if the central
government set air quality standards and Christchurch fails to meet those
standards in a particular year it is hard to tell if this is because of insufficient
effort, or uncontrollable factors such as weather, or unexpected economic
growth.
The third contracting problem that is prevalent here is that rewards and
punishments are limited.  In general, the RMA does not provide central funding
for the activities it requires of local authorities.  The punishments for non-
compliance through the Environment Court are uncertain, slow and limited.  The
informal punishments, e.g.: risk of local government reform, are extremely
uncertain.  Local government is extremely limited in its ability to reward central
government agencies for their assistance.  They have limited financial
resources, and very little political power.
Solutions to contracting problems
There are three possible solutions to the adverse selection problem.  First, if we
believe the capability to produce at low cost is positively related to the ability to
produce at scale, jurisdictions may be able to be induced to reveal their costs.
They could be offered a choice between a large quantity of output at a high total
price and a smaller quantity of output with a lower total, but higher average,
price.  The less efficient jurisdictions will choose the higher average price and
lower output, while the more efficient will find the larger contract more attractive.
This only works where outputs from different jurisdictions are substitutes.
Second, we can compare productivity and costs across jurisdictions.  To the
extent that costs are similar among different jurisdictions, observing relative
costs produces information about each jurisdiction’s true costs.  This is
particularly useful for adjusting payments over time.  Finally, where the private
information is about quality, although quality may not be immediately
observable or rewardable, it may become obvious over time.  Future contracts
may depend on the good reputation high quality outputs generate.  If creating
reputations is important it is critical to maintain and develop institutional
memory.
When it is difficult to observe effort, effort is often rewarded indirectly through
rewards for observable outputs.19 Politically desired outcomes are ideally
achieved by contracting for specific non-discretionary outputs.  Unfortunately
measurable outputs, that relate clearly to outcomes, are frequently not
available.  Definition of some outputs, that are part of the efficient production of
outcomes, without incentives for the other non-measurable outputs tends to
                                           
19  This is the standard problem of moral hazard.38
lead to serious misallocation of effort toward measurable, rewarded outputs.  It
may be preferable to reward on the basis of a measure of the outcome of
interest.  Here a tradeoff arises between giving unbalanced incentives, and
giving weak incentives and forcing agents to bear risk when they are rewarded
on the basis of outcomes they only partially control.
The inability to reward or punish sufficiently has no direct solution other than
finding additional resources to increase incentives.  Non-financial incentives to
encourage voluntary compliance may be worth exploring.  Otherwise realistic
limits should be put on expectations so that limited resources are used as
effectively as possible.  Unrealistic, unenforceable mandates may backfire and
make future action even more difficult.
Informal / Non-financial contracts
 A contract does not need to be a written, strictly enforceable document.  A
contract in many cases is more of a relationship.  When the contracting
problems above cannot be clearly solved the informal elements of a contract
become more important.  Personal relationships between officials at central and
local government levels, concern by implementers for their reputation,
promotion incentives, and publicity for successes and failures all provide more
diffuse incentives for good performance.  Building a good “corporate culture”
may be as important as the formal rules for encouraging pride and high
productivity.  These aspects cannot be created overnight but can be destroyed.
Any reform should pay attention to preserving beneficial relationships and
practices and maintaining good aspects of corporate culture, such as morale
and team spirit.  These aspects are less amenable to hard analysis but become
critical when other forms of contract are weak.  Non financial incentives are an
area that, in the New Zealand public sector reforms, may have been under-
exploited.
Advantages of separating political and implementation roles: the regulator
/ provider split
Combining the political and implementation roles can also create problems.  For
example, local governments may face a conflict between their decisions under
the RMA and their provision of infrastructure.  Local government provides local
infrastructure services.  It is difficult for them to plan the management of these
assets (as required under the Local Government Act) when they cannot control
where new development takes place. They therefore have a tendency to over-
control commercial activity.  This illustrates the advantages of a regulator /
provider split.   In some situations, if decisions are made by those dealing on a
day to day basis with the landowners and industries they regulate, the regulator
might be ‘captured’ and fail to represent the wider interests of society.  The
problem of ‘capture’ may be less acute in the RMA because we are dealing with
directly politically accountable bodies although, given the failures of the
democratic process, similar problems may arise.  In addition, the problems of
regulatory capture may sometime be overstated relative to the advantages,39
trust, cooperation and good information flows, that close relationships can
generate.
The Framework: The Whole Picture
Figure 5 combines Figure 3 and Figure 4.
























The framework can be used in several ways.  The first is to analyse the sources
of success and failure in current policies.  For a particular issue, identify the
location of benefits, and the location and importance of subjective and objective
information and skills.  Then from the policy, identify the location of political
decisions, implementation, and cost bearing.  Draw lines between the nodes
where the location is the same.  The lines indicate the advantages of the current
policy structure.  Where lines do not connect nodes, we might expect that
problems will arise.  We can compare these predicted advantages and
problems with observable experience.
The second use would be to design new policy structures.  Here we would start
with the issue-specific location of benefits and information, and the importance
of different types of information, and then try to choose the optimal location for40
each bubble, making tradeoffs between the matches that are formed.  In some
cases, where no objective information or specialised skills are relevant, or they
are held in the same location as the benefits, all nodes can have the same
location and no conflict arises.  Subdivision is an example of this.  In other
cases, effects are local but important objective information and skills are held
centrally.  Here conflict arises in choice of implementation location.
Alternatively, implementation is ideally national, but political decision making is
ideally local (or vice versa), and they are difficult to decouple.  The decision on
how to deal with this conflict feeds through to the choice of locations for cost
bearing.  An example of this situation is discussed in depth in the companion
paper (WP 98/7a) on kiwi habitat.
The third use arises when there are unavoidable conflicts in choice of ‘location’.
If a link cannot be achieved, a problem arises.  Alternative approaches may
exist for achieving the benefit that the match between levels of jurisdiction
achieves.  If, for example, implementation is local but there is significant
objective information and need for specialised skills which are held centrally,
provision may be inefficient.  If we develop effective means of communication
between central information holders and local implementers, this conflict can be
reduced.
The menu of locational choices for the choice nodes is limited in reality by our
existing structures of government.  We do not have separate government or
even separate laws, for every issue, so it is rare that the area of effects exactly
matches the jurisdiction of political decision making or the area where costs are
borne.  Most decisions are a compromise among various concerns.  Figure 5
helps clarify the necessary choices and the tradeoffs.
To this point we have looked at the choice of level of government for different
functions in terms of fundamental characteristics of the issue and the capability
of jurisdictions.  We have implicitly assumed that each level of government is
equally accountable both in terms of social decision making and for efficiency of
implementation.  In addition we have only concerned ourselves with the
outcomes of the political process not the process itself.  Relaxing either of these
constraints might alter our conclusions.41
6 ACCOUNTABILITY OF GOVERNMENT
Even where benefits, costs and decisions are all aligned social decisions and
implementation may be poor if the government structure is inherently inefficient
or unaccountable.  Both local and central government face accountability
problems. If local government is considered to be less accountable, it may be
worth trading off the heterogeneity of local decisions, or the benefits of balanced
decision making for improved political accountability by making decisions at the
national level.
Governments are ultimately accountable to voters.  Constituents vote based on
their preferences, their beliefs about what MPs/councillors/political parties will
do, and their observations about the outputs and outcomes achieved by
government.  To the limited extent that voting reflects past outputs and
outcomes, individuals and governments are accountable for these.  Media and
citizen watchdog groups may be able to make them more directly accountable
for particular outputs and outcomes by making these transparent.
Local Government Accountability Advantages
In some ways the problems from poor public choice mechanisms reduce as the
scope and size of the jurisdiction falls.  Voters express their interests more
directly when the vote is over a narrow range of issues e.g.: water
management.  As preferences become more homogenous with smaller
jurisdictions, voting cycles, and problems arising from differences in intensity of
preference, or double peaked preferences become less serious.  Taking the
arguments for improving preference representation to an extreme, however,
each individual would ultimately need to vote for a different organisation on
each issue, and different organisations would operate for each externality
boundary.  This is clearly unworkable.
The larger the number of agents responsible for controlling a given resource,
the harder it is to observe each agent’s effort because the observable resource
outcome is a poor indicator of the agent’s effort.  When information about
agents’ efforts is poor, agents are less accountable. Effective accountability
structures balance the risk imposed on agents against the strength of the
incentives they face.  If the contract is based on poor information and hence
imposes unreasonable risks on agents, in reality the contract will break down.
They will not be held responsible for outcomes clearly beyond their control.
The link between constituent and agent is closer in local than in central
government.  The local constituents can more easily monitor the agents’
provision efforts.  The local official may have a reasonable level of control over
the local outcomes, particularly process outcomes.  In contrast, in central
government, an individual official is part of a much larger bureaucracy and may
have less discretionary power and hence less control over outcomes.42
To the extent that constituents are mobile, the existence of multiple jurisdictions
will make jurisdictions compete for constituents by providing good services
more efficiently.  This will lead to downward pressure on costs of provision.
Local governments may be more accountable to constituents because of their
small size, and their need to compete, but less accountable if local political
structures are ineffective.
Local government is also accountable to central government.  Central
government defines the powers of local government and constrains their actions
through legislation enforceable by the Environment Court.  To a certain extent,
local government is accountable to central government because of the threat of
changes to their powers.  Local governments may try to anticipate the concerns
of central government to minimise this threat.
National Government Accountability Advantages
In the other direction, constituents have less control over a large number of
governments.  As the number of organisations grows, each one tends to
become less accountable and more able to be manipulated by special
interests.20  Constituents who express political preferences bear costs of doing
so.  When an issue has a small impact on a large number of people, each
individual will tend not to get involved; i.e. they will free ride on others’ political
participation.  Only concentrated interests will express their preferences.
Decisions will be seriously biased.  In some ways this is what NZ moved away
from with Local Government Reform.
Central government is a more sophisticated institution with better resources,
including internal accountability structures.  This may give it some advantage in
social decision making and efficient provision.  It is likely to be more politically
accountable, to the extent that political pressure and lobbying is more
sophisticated at the central rather than local level.  Its disadvantages are
distance from the affected community, and the fact that there are few mobility
pressures on central government.  Dissatisfied voters may express themselves
more effectively through voting for central government than local government,
but they cannot easily express their discontent by leaving.
These issues are beyond the scope of the current paper but raise a number of
questions.  Is local government more accountable and responsive than central
government, or less? Do people vote in local body elections? Who controls local
government?  Will local governments become more accountable as they
become more powerful?  Do they represent the interests of all the people within
them?  What about the interests of potential migrants?  Which element
dominates in the tension between increasing accountability and improving
public choice through greater observability of actions, and greater homogeneity
on the one hand, and decreasing accountability through capture by specific
local interests on the other?
                                           
20 Tullock,  198043
Sovereignty issues
People may believe that they can make better decisions in their own interests.
In addition, however, the value of devolution may not be simply measured in
terms of the outcomes, observed as changes in resource use and allocation,
but also the process.  The ability to control your own life and community has a
value irrespective of the use made of it.  Many people would prefer their own
inefficiency to efficiency imposed by central government.
A critical example of this in New Zealand arises with Maori sovereignty.  Maori
do not want control over their lands and resources only because they think they
will get greater value out of them, but also for reasons of mana and
rangatiratanga.  This concern also applies to many small communities who
have a strong local identity or a distrust of central authority.  This issue was
epitomised by the bitter fight over the amalgamation of different local bodies
during the local government reform.
7  Conclusions and recommendations
“God grant me the serenity to accept the things I cannot change,
courage to change the things I can,
and the wisdom to know the difference” The Serenity Prayer, By Reinhold
Neibuhr
The appropriate level of devolution varies depending on the characteristics of
the issue and the nature of the institutions involved.  When devolution decisions
relating to a large number of issues are made simultaneously tradeoffs
inevitably arise among issues.  For a given set of institutions and jurisdictional
boundaries options are more limited still.  Nevertheless, by understanding the
nature of the tradeoffs we gain insight into the situations where it is worth
challenging the status quo, the situations where we should endeavour to
improve the functioning of existing structures, and the situations where some
degree of poor decisions and inefficiency are not worth addressing.
The RMA has been used to illustrate how the devolution framework may be
applied to a particular area of policy.  In many ways, the 1991 New Zealand
Resource Management Act is a bold policy experiment.  It is an integrated,
relatively comprehensive piece of resource management legislation.  It
emphasises local public participation and has, on an international scale, a very
high level of devolution.
Many problems have arisen since the RMA’s inception.  Many of these existed
under prior legislation, and the amalgamation of many Acts has simply
concentrated them, while others have arisen since 1991.  The problems have
three basic sources:44
(i)  a mismatch of the jurisdictions of political decision making, benefits, cost
bearing, and implementation,
(ii)  poor relationships among levels of government, and
(iii) poor institutional structures within jurisdictions.
This paper has focussed on the first two sources of problems.  New Zealanders
have a tendency to address problems with legislative and fundamental
institutional reform.  We conclude that the legal/institutional structure of
devolution in the RMA is basically sound.  Where devolution issues do arise
there is a tradeoff between the value of comprehensive legislation and the costs
of legislation that forces many very different issues to be addressed within the
same structure.
The analysis in this paper suggests that effective devolution requires attention
to the relationship between central and local government as well as attention to
the ideal location of decision making.  The recommendations below are likely to
be helpful in guiding future policy on devolution:
.
(i) Clarify responsibilities
Problems can arise when central government intends local government to make
decisions but does not make this clear.  Where it does want to influence local
government, it should provide sufficient guidance.  Lack of clarity over
responsibilities leads to situations where local government does not feel
empowered, and neither local or central government regards itself as fully
accountable.
(ii)  Improve formal and informal contracts between Central and Local
government.
Where the political decision-maker is separate from the implementer of policy,
or the implementer is separate from the holder of critical skills and objective
information, the effectiveness of policy depends critically on the quality of the
“contract” between the two.  Attention needs to be paid to the incentives of each
level of government to cooperate with the other and meet their needs.  Central
government agencies may need to be proactive in providing support to
implementers who may not know what help they need and hence may be
unable to contract for it.  One aspect of the contract is the formal, written
specification of expected outputs, monitoring responsibilities and rewards.
Perhaps an equally, and under-utilised component of contracts is the informal
contract that arises through long term personal relationships, corporate culture
and morale, trust and concern for reputation.  These aspects develop through
repeated interaction, information sharing, participation in decision-making, and
consistent, open honest behaviour on both sides.  Some attention to preserving
and developing these aspects of contracts may be rewarding.45
(iii) Reduce duplication of objective information and technical skills
Central government can also contribute to effective devolution by retaining a
role in providing easy access to technical information and best-practice
techniques.  In the case of the RMA, for example, one approach would be to
provide standardised ‘plans’ for local councils that can be adjusted to local
needs and interests.  Make these simple and close to current practice rather
than very ambitious.  This will reduce the cost of council compliance with the
Act and allow them to focus on specifically local concerns.  It will allow
incremental change and would help move the ‘status quo’ from Town and
Country Planning Act type planning toward RMA based regulation.   It will also
make changes and variances in policy across councils more transparent.
(iv) Facilitate communication
Communication of experiences and practices between central and local
government and among local governments will enhance learning and reduce
the costs of experimentation.  This can be done by focusing on developing
relationships among key people, and by developing consistent information
systems.
The central government may also have a role in improving the functioning of
local institutions to make them more efficient and more responsive to local
preferences.
(v) Strengthen the political accountability of local government
The key argument for local government’s existence is that local government
represents local preferences.  Any improvements in the local political process
will enhance the benefits of devolution. In some cases central government may
decide that the poor political accountability of local government or their limited
capacity makes it inappropriate for them to make certain types of decision.  In
this case it may be appropriate to limit the scope of local government activity as
a last resort.
(vi) Facilitate Innovation in local regulation
Local governments may not have the skills and resources to innovate and adopt
new practices.  They may not take into account the benefits their
experimentation could have for other districts.
In some situations the mismatches among locations of functions and
characteristics are so egregious that the best solution may be to change the
level of devolution.  One example of this is Significant Natural Areas discussed
in the companion paper (WP 98/7a).  Central government can reclaim authority
over issues by using the provision for National Policy Statements within the
RMA.   Other issues could be dealt with within the RMA but may benefit from
separate treatment.46
Future Directions for Research
In many ways this paper raises as many questions as it answers.  Future
research on devolution could usefully take a number of directions.  It is
inherently difficult to assess the quality of outcomes because part of the point of
devolution is to allow heterogeneous outcomes to reflect unobservable
preferences.  Thus we can most effectively explore the efficiency of devolution
in general, and the RMA in particular, by using indirect methods.  A number of
empirical and theoretical ideas could be explored further.  We list a few
questions below.
1.  How heterogeneous are New Zealanders’ preferences on different issues?
2.  How well does local government reflect local preferences?
3.  Can local government be made more politically accountable?
4.  What compensation mechanisms could be developed between central and
local government, and within local jurisdictions?
5.  What are the capability limitations of local government?  Should we try to
improve their capability, limit their activities, or accept the inefficiency?
6.  What incentives do central government agencies have to provide proactive
and reactive assistance to local government?
7.  How appropriate is the split, in the current RMA, between regional councils
and territorial local authorities?
Finally we emphasise that effective policy making and implementation require
more than correct levels of devolution.  Many aspects of the RMA were beyond
the scope of this paper.  Other key issues for any review of the effectiveness of
the RMA include clarity and consistency of the law itself, technical issues of how
to integrate different environmental concerns, and the potential of alternative
policy instruments for achieving the goals of the Act.  All of these issues are
important.  By clarifying the issues related to devolution we hope that it will be
easier to distinguish problems that arise from devolution, and problems that
would arise in any structure.  Analysts will be more able to understand the true
causes of problems, analyse them in the appropriate context.47
APPENDICES
Appendix One: The Resource Management Act 1991
  The Resource Management Act 1991 (RMA) is the principal legislation
governing the use of New Zealand’s land, air, water, ecosystems, soils, geology
and the built environment.  Also controlled are noise, pollution and geothermal
activities.
 
  The RMA was intended to provide a framework for simplifying environmental
management in New Zealand.  In total it repealed 59 statutes.  The most
significant of the repealed acts were:
 
·  The Water and Soil Conservation Act (1967);
 
·  The Clean Air Act (1972);
 
·  The Town and Country Planning Act (1977); and
 
·  The Noise Control Act (1982).
 
  Under previous Acts devoted to resource management in New Zealand there
was widespread dissatisfaction.  In many cases, the legislation was seen as
conflicting, overlapping and confusing.  Major problems identified at the time
included:
 
·  the collection of Acts did not have a standard purpose as they were written
for a variety of purposes;
 
·  there were a number of agencies involved in resource management, with
overlapping responsibilities and poor accountability;
 
·  consent procedures were lengthy and complex;
 
·  enforcement and monitoring were weak; and
 
·  the opportunity for the public to be involved was limited.
 
  A more integrated and coordinated process for resource management was
required.
 
Major Aspects of the RMA
  The RMA is based on two major assumptions: that governing bodies closest to
resources are the most appropriate to govern the use of those resources, and
that it is more efficient to focus control and regulation on the adverse48
environmental effects of some activities rather than the activities themselves.
Therefore, authority for implementing the RMA is devolved to local and regional
authorities.
 
  Role of Central Government
  Central government has a role in setting policy on matters of national
significance and monitoring the implementation of the Act.  Central government
may issue national policy statements, prepare national environmental
standards, or call-in any resource consent application for a Ministerial decision.
At this time, however, only one national policy statement, the Coastal Policy
Statement, has been written.
 
  The Ministry for the Environment makes submissions on draft regional plans
and provides support and training via the provision of best practice guidelines
and the provision of information documents.
 
  Roles of Local Authorities
  Regional councils manage water, soil, geothermal resources, pollution, and land
use that affects natural resources.  Regions prepare regional policy statements
and coastal plans which must be consistent with national policy statements.
Regional councils are responsible for monitoring the state of the environment,
consent compliance and plan effectiveness.
 
  Territorial local authorities are responsible for land management, subdivision
and noise control.  They are required to develop district plans, which must be
consistent with relevant regional and national plans.
 
  All local authorities are required under section 6 of the RMA to provide for
matters of national importance.  These are defined as the protection or
preservation of:
 
·  the natural character of the coastal environment (including the coastal
marine area), wetlands, and lakes and rivers;
 
·  outstanding natural features and landscapes from inappropriate
subdivision, use, and development;
 
·  areas of significant indigenous vegetation and significant habitats of
indigenous fauna;
 
·  public access to and along the coastal marine area, lakes, and rivers; and
 
·  the relationship of Maori and their culture and traditions with their ancestral
lands, water, sites, waahi tapu, and other taonga.49
Local government agencies are required under Section 32 of the RMA to satisfy
themselves that any policy proposed to achieve the purposes of the Act is
necessary and is superior to any policy alternatives.  They have significant
flexibility to choose any policy mechanism they consider most appropriate.
They may use rules, market mechanisms or education programmes as long as
they avoid and mitigate effects on the environment.  On private land, activities
are allowed unless specifically prohibited in a plan or rule.  For all other natural
resources, activities are prohibited and require a consent, unless expressly
allowed in a plan.
There are five types of resource consents, land use, subdivision, coastal, water
and discharge.  Activities are also classified into five categories ranging from
permitted activities (where no consent is required) to prohibited activities (an
activity is expressly prohibited).  The three intermediate categories allow
activities but with conditions.  Regions issue coastal, water and discharge
permits.  TLAs issue land use and subdivision consents.
Public Participation
The public can make submissions on both the resource consent process and
the planning processes for plans and regional policy statements.  The public
can also seek a declaration from the Environment Court on plan provisions.
The Environment Court can impose enforcement orders to restrain
environmentally damaging activities.  Local authorities can issue abatement
notices.  Failure to comply constitutes an offence and can result in fines or
imprisonment.
Local Government Reform
Resource management reform in New Zealand was related to local government
reform, also occurring in the late 1980s, as local government is primarily
responsible for implementing resource management initiatives.
Prior to reform, local government included more than 800 local authorities and
special boards and elected boroughs.  Following the enactment of amendments
to the Local Government Act in 1989, local government had been transformed
into 86 local authorities, made up of 12 regional councils and 74 local councils
and four unitary authorities.
Government expected these reforms to improve the efficiency of local
government, ensure clear accountability and allow local government to focus on
resource management decisions.  By reducing the number of councils, the
reforms increased average council size and increased their capacity to
effectively analyse resource management issues.
The conglomeration of the range of specialised boards, for issues such as pest
control, into single council units may have also acted to set the RMA up as a
lightning rod for complaints and frustration.  Whereas in the past several boards50
may have provided consents for one activity, after the reforms one dealt with all
consents, thus concentrating any complaints.51
Appendix Two: Why and what should we regulate?
“The purpose of this Act is to promote the sustainable management of natural
and physical resources.” (Section 5, RMA 1991)
Why is special legislation needed for the management of natural and physical
resources?  The fundamental problem with resources is that many of the
property rights are not fully allocated and enforced.  Unregulated resource
markets would lead to inefficiency because of externalities.  They would allow
some agents to claim the unallocated resources for their own use.  This is an
undemocratic, inequitable way to allocate resources that were previously held in
common.  Imperfect information about the effects of resource use is the other
important market failure in the allocation of resources.
Externalities / Incomplete Allocation of Property Rights
Whenever property rights are incompletely defined or enforced, externalities
and public good situations arise and resources can be allocated inefficiently
without intervention.21  An externality arises whenever an individual does not
bear the full costs, or receive the full benefits of her action.  For example an
unregulated factory which emits effluent into a river benefits from waste
disposal, but does not bear the cost of downstream pollution.  Externalities
occur wherever there are incomplete property rights or missing markets.  It is
not sufficient that property rights exist, they must also be transferable. Negative
externalities will be overproduced, Q rather than Q*, because the producer sets
private marginal cost equal to the marginal benefit of the externality producing
activity.  Private marginal cost is below social marginal cost (taking into account
self-protection / adaptive behaviour) by the amount of the externality.
                                           
21  For more detailed discussion see Baumol and Oates (1975)52













Even where property rights exist, they may be unenforceable.  A pure public
good is a good that it is difficult to exclude people from consuming, and that has
a zero marginal cost of provision to an additional person.  For example, an
attractive view from a public road.  When an individual provides a public good,
by for example maintaining an attractive property, they are generating positive
externalities to all who enjoy that public good.  The provider does not receive all
the benefits.  Property rights to public goods are impossible to enforce because
people cannot be excluded from using the good.  Public goods will be under-
produced because the producer will set private marginal benefit equal to private
marginal cost.  For public goods, social marginal benefit is the sum of all private
marginal benefits, not only the producer’s benefit. The under-provision situation
is even worse if there are several potential providers who each rely on the
others’ provision rather than providing the good themselves.  With a large
number of potential providers, almost no public good will be produced.
Where an activity or good has private benefits as well as public, the private
benefits may be sufficient that at the level of private provision the marginal
public value is zero.  In this case there is no deliberate production of the public
good but an efficient level is coincidentally produced.  For example, attractive
rural views will be well provided in areas where farming is profitable; native
forest cover will be privately provided in areas where the current economic
value from using the land for non-forest activities is zero.53











A related situation is that of “common property resources”.  A common property
resource is one that many individuals can partially control, for example a fishery
with many fishermen.  When an individual uses the resource he creates a
negative externality for all other users.  The negative externality leads to
overuse of the resource, and an inefficient outcome for the whole group of
common owners.  This is known as the ‘tragedy of the commons’.22
“Private” solutions for externality problems
Incomplete, unenforceable or common property rights lead to inefficiency in a
purely individualistic world.  Does this mean that government is needed to
control these resources? The existence of a market failure does not mean that
government should regulate.  Government may not be able to solve the market
failure, and could introduce failures of its own, “government failures” which
could exacerbate the problem.  One argument against intensive government
intervention is that all that is necessary is to define the property rights, and
negotiation and the common law system will allocate resources efficiently.  This
argument is based on the Coase Theorem (Coase, 1960) which states that
when property rights are fully allocated, and transferable, and there are no
transaction costs, resources will be allocated efficiently regardless of the initial
allocation.  The initial allocation will still have distributional effects.
The Coase Theorem suggests that many externality issues can be resolved
privately.  In fact this is what occurs whenever a new market is created for a
good that was previously outside the market, e.g.: the recent development of
private rubbish collection in Wellington. These private solutions still require
some government involvement, government still needs to define and enforce
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property rights, but it is a very unintrusive form of regulation. In the rubbish
collection case, the government establishes property rights to the use of land for
disposal by banning dumping of rubbish, and other forms of inappropriate
disposal.  The limits to the use of private solutions depend on the existence of
transaction costs, and the ability to fully allocate and enforce property rights.
When can the Resource Management Act’s role be limited to defining and
enforcing property rights?
Transaction costs arise primarily from information asymmetries and costs of
coordination among large groups.  If the ‘victim’ of an externality is unable to
observe its production, she is unable to enforce any agreement about the level
of production.  If either the victim or polluter cannot observe the other’s costs
and benefits from the pollution, bargaining to find the efficient level is costly and
likely to end up at an inefficient level.23  If transactions are costly, the use of
resources will be biased toward the initial allocation, which then has efficiency
as well as distributional effects.
Costs of coordination are low when an externality is limited to a very small
number of producers and victims who are geographically, temporally and
socially closely linked.  When a pollutant affects a large number of people,
comes from several sources, or has effects over a number of years, it is
unreasonable to expect all the affected parties to negotiate successfully.
Providing coordination is itself a public good and hence is under-provided.
The ability of government to fully allocate and enforce property rights come into
play for common resources and public goods.  Some goods inherently cannot
be allocated because of their physical characteristics (e.g.: fish that migrate, oil
fields and ground water, air).  These may be most appropriately treated and
regulated as common property.  Pseudo property rights can be allocated
through the creation of tradeable permits for use.  Some level of government
must enforce these.  There are few incentives for permit holders to ensure
enforcement through normal legal channels.  The government cannot charge
directly for the use of public goods because it is impossible to stop people using
them and hence impossible to enforce payment.  Government must regulate on
the provision side not the consumption side.
In some cases communities do manage to agree on mechanisms to share
common resources or provide public goods.  Ostrom (1990) gives an example
in Southern California where a community agreed on a system to manage
groundwater.  After making the agreement, the community appealed to the
government to impose this as a regulation, to take advantage of the
government’s powers to enforcement, and to bind actors who may migrate into
the area who were not party to the original agreement.  In some other
examples, the community designs and enforces the agreement.  For example in
Maine, local communities restrict access to lobsters by dividing the resource
among the community and enforcing this with local community social pressure.
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They are, however, occasionally forced to resort to violence against people from
outside the community, to maintain their local control.
Ostrom also gives numerous examples where local control of common
resources fails because the community is too large, too mobile, or simply fails to
find an effective mechanism.  Unfortunately this is the norm for valuable
common resources in modern society.   Private provision of public goods and
protection of common resources generally fails.
Another enforcement problem arises with limited liability companies and
externalities that involve risks of pollution rather than actual pollution.  If, for
example, a company is managing hazardous waste, it may not create day to
day pollution.  Each day they risk an accident and should take an efficient level
of precautionary measures.  If however a major accident occurs, the company
will go bankrupt and will not be forced to bear all the costs they impose.24
Knowing this, companies will take less than efficient measures to prevent major
problems though they may deal efficiently with small day to day risks.  Normal
legal liability for damages will lead to inefficient outcomes.  One way to deal with
this problem, is to require a company to purchase insurance from a third party
with the ability to cover the costs of the largest accident.  The insurance
premium will reflect the level of care the insurance company observes.   The
insurance contract will increase the level of precaution and will move some risk
from the public to the insurance company; it will not perfectly solve the problem
because the moral hazard problem remains.
A similar problem arises because damages can be hard to collect ex post,
particularly when they are large.  A common example of this is strip mining,
which causes unsightly damage and runoff.  Mining companies are required to
restore the land but often do not do so in a satisfactory or timely way.  Some
companies dissolve after the mine is closed, making it difficult to punish them.
One solution to this is to require the company to post an environmental bond
equal to the expected cost of restoration.  The bond would be returned when
the company can show that it has either avoided or mitigated any damage.
Even when property rights are allocated, and relatively smooth negotiation does
occur, the initial allocation of property rights still matters for efficiency if the
parties actually negotiating do not represent all the interests.  For example,
when environmental groups are negotiating with oil companies and mining
interests, because conservation is a public good, the environmental groups will
tend to be inefficiently under-resourced.  Although some efficiency gain can be
realised, this lack of resources will inefficiently bias the outcome away from
conservation.
When transaction costs are high, on efficiency grounds, government should
endeavour to allocate property rights to those most likely to gain the greatest
value to avoid serious misallocation. This probably implies that landowners
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should have the status quo property rights to alter private land (e.g.: through
subdivision or building).  This is consistent with the part of the Act, which states
that activities on private land are permitted unless the plan expressly restricts
them.  However it may be in conflict with the right of any citizen to make
submissions on and appeal consent decisions.
If one group faces higher transaction costs of initiating negotiation than the
other, other things equal, it is better to allocate the rights to the group with high
transaction costs.  Negotiation will then be more likely to occur if resources are
misallocated.  In New Zealand, where non-governmental organisations are
poorly developed and funded, they are finding the costs of full participation in
the RMA process prohibitive.  Tangata whenua are also finding participation
costly.  Large businesses may be able to provide information and set up
processes to negotiate their bid or claim for resources more efficiently than
community groups.  This is consistent with the Act’s provision that public
resources cannot be used by private actors unless it is specifically allowed; the
community has the status quo property rights, not potential users of public
resources.
Finally, some groups are unable to represent themselves, e.g.: future
generations.  Government sometimes needs to act as their agents to protect
their interests when intergenerational altruism is insufficient and current and
future interests are misaligned.
Allocation and enforcement of property rights, and limited regulation (such as
tradeable permit markets or environmental bonds) are sufficient to address
some resource issues, but in other situations, direct government regulation and
provision are needed.
Information Failures
Resources, and especially environmental resources, such as clean air, are
often unusual commodities.  Many of their characteristics are unobservable by
those who consume them.  For example, many pollutants are undetectable by
human senses even if they are causing harm.   In addition, many of the
resource issues we deal with today are relatively new issues so people are
unaccustomed to them.  The possible dangers from cell phone use and towers
are only now becoming an issue.  Many pollutants are only dangerous above a
threshold that is only being passed now because of population and economic
growth.  Many common resources only become scarce with congestion and
heavy demand.  Some problems are old, but only now recognised, or concern
has risen with higher income levels.  Newness means that individuals have not
developed experience, and institutions to disseminate information are poorly
developed.
Because of the newness of the issues, and the lack of observability, and the
physical nature of resources, understanding their effects often requires
specialised scientific knowledge and understanding.  The inherent complexity of57
the issues is exacerbated because many environmental effects are on health of
humans or ecosystems and involve risk rather than certain effects.  If a pollutant
only harms one person in a thousand it is difficult to observe its effect, and
difficult for an individual to decide the appropriate level of protective action.
Many effects only occur over long periods of time so by the time the effects are
observed it is too late to prevent future effects, and also difficult to identify the
true causes of the effects.  The uncertainty and the time frame problems plague
epidemiological studies and understanding of ecological stability, and make it
impossible for any individual to learn from experience and observation.
These acute information problems create a potential role for government in
information collection and dissemination, and possibly in setting basic standards
of protection.  Individuals need information to take efficient precautionary
measures and to negotiate effectively with polluters of victims.  Regulators,
whether local or central, also need this information to make and implement
regulations effectively.
What is the role of the RMA?
The RMA has a broad mandate across types of resources.  For which issues
are the failures of private solutions to externalities sufficiently great that
government regulation is needed?  Where can government regulation be limited
to the definition and enforcement of property rights to facilitate private
solutions?  Theory suggests government should focus on regulating
externalities that affect public goods and common property resources,
particularly those that involve high ongoing costs, high risks or large one time
damages.
Regulation of non-public externalities could be limited to a facilitation role.
Local government should be able to facilitate agreements on externalities that
affect very small numbers of people. Their role should be limited to mediation,
and recording and enforcing agreements among affected parties.  Where there
are many similar situations, e.g.: minor house alterations, duplication of
negotiations may be avoided by having rules of thumb for activities that are
allowed without the agreement of other affected parties.  Elsewhere they can
reduce transaction costs by certifying the credibility of information, and
providing a forum for discussion.
In terms of information, the government should focus on identifying critical
information problems.  These could be situations where the potential harm is
great, costs of avoidance are low relative to the harm, and individual information
is poor. In terms of devolution, the question is what level of government most
effectively collects, analyses and disseminates data and sets standards.58
Appendix Three: The Tiebout Model of Mobility and Preference Revelation
The preference revelation problems ultimately arise because there is no market
for public goods. This problem is unavoidable at a central government level, but,
with a mobile population, can be argued to be less of a problem for local
government.  If mobility is significant, local governments can act as
entrepreneurs that offer different packages of local public goods and taxes.
Because of interjurisdictional competition, jurisdictions have incentives to
provide the public good mix that agents, and particularly mobile agents, want.
These entrepreneurs also have incentives to provide the local public goods in
an efficient way. This leads to a strong argument for devolution of decision
making on public goods.
The Tiebout model (Tiebout, 1956) is based on a competitive market analogy.
Entrepreneurs create communities, provide local public goods and charge an
access cost.  Boundaries of communities are endogenous. Individuals choose
jurisdictions / communities based on the level of local public goods they provide
and the access cost.  People reveal their preferences with their feet.  Under
strict conditions, outlined below, each individual will end up in a community that
produces exactly the level of public goods she desires. All individuals within a
community will be identical.  Competition among communities will ensure that
each community will be the size that produces the public goods efficiently.
Thus the preference revelation problem and the efficient provision problem are
solved.  Public goods are produced efficiently.  In this world, central
government’s role would be limited to giving local communities the ability to
demand payment for services within communities, and helping local
communities enforce such service contracts.
The Tiebout model is a theoretical construction not a model of reality.  Its value
in providing insight into the benefits of devolution depends partly on whether its
assumptions have any relationship with reality.25  Rubinfeld summarises the
Tiebout assumptions as follows:
1. Individuals have perfect information.
2.  Mobility is costless and is responsive only to fiscal conditions.
3.  Public goods are provided at minimum average cost within each
jurisdiction.  Each new migrant to a community pays an access cost equal
to the cost of providing public services to that migrant.
4.  There are no interjurisdictional externalities.
5.  There are a sufficient number of jurisdictions and a sufficient number of
households of each type (in terms of tastes and incomes) so that each
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jurisdiction can contain identical individuals.  Thus new communities can
be developed costlessly.
6.  There is no public choice mechanism other than the utility-maximising
decision of an identical set of individuals.
7.  All income is dividend income, not generated by private production.  There
is no labour market.
8.  Public goods are financed by lump sum taxes.
9.  There is no land, no housing, and therefore no capitalisation.
If individuals have any information about local public goods and are at all
mobile, some preference revelation will occur and there will be some
competitive pressures among jurisdictions.
The preference revelation benefits from devolution derive partly from the
competition type mechanisms of Tiebout, that come through mobility, and partly
from improved social choice mechanisms in smaller jurisdictions.  Social choice
is more important in the short run.   Mobility takes effect over time.
Mobility in New Zealand
Mobility is not costless, and is determined by many factors other than the
provision of public goods.  People develop strong attachments to a community.
When they do move, work opportunities are a major driver.  Thus, not everyone
moves whenever they are dissatisfied with their local public good provision.
Those who do move may not get a level of public good provision they prefer.
How mobile are New Zealanders?
24% of New Zealanders, living in New Zealand in 1996, had moved into their
current territorial local authority since 1991 (NZ Census, 1996).  5% of these
were coming from overseas, while 19% had moved from elsewhere in New
Zealand.  This means that approximately one in every four people had the
chance, constrained by employment opportunities, to choose their level of
public service provision over the five-year period 1991 - 1996.
New Zealand is a small country with few large cities so the potential for large
numbers of jurisdictions offering a wide range of levels of public goods is
limited.  Many of the public goods in New Zealand, that the Resource
Management Act is concerned with, are related to nature.  Thus they are
geographically constrained and may not easily be altered by local government
action.
On the other hand, there are significant cultural differences between rural and
urban areas, and among rural areas such as Northland, Waikato and Otago.
There are differences in culture within cities, e.g.: the North Shore vs.60
Waitakere.  There are cultural differences between predominantly maori
communities and pakeha communities.  There is probably greater heterogeneity
between communities than within them.  These cultural differences are likely to
be reflected in the nature of public goods chosen, and the attitudes to resource
regulation.  There also are significant income differences between communities
which is reflected in the level of local public goods e.g.: Manukau vs. Auckland
City.  Over time, people (particularly the young and immigrants) move to new
jobs and their choices of location are partly determined by the “culture” of the
areas.  Cities that provide an attractive “culture” will grow and be rewarded with
larger revenue bases.
Gradual mobility, and existing clusters of similar people, means that devolution
does have the potential to provide a wider range of public goods which satisfy
diverse community preferences in New Zealand.  However people who do move
are not representative of the total population.  For example, they tend to be
younger.  If the provision of public goods does respond to the demands of
people who move, they will not reflect the preferences of the stable community
members.  Policies to increase mobility may improve the match between
preferences and public goods, and will certainly lead to more efficient allocation
of labour, but it also has social disadvantages.  The social capital in
communities may be one of their primary attractions, yet excessive mobility
tends to destroy it.
Problems with Mobility and Efficiency
Effects of Financing Public Good Provision on Efficient Migration Patterns
Public good provision, and the taxes associated with it, not only satisfies a static
demand for services, they also generate a dynamic response.  If unanticipated,
this dynamic feedback could lead to damaging results.  In the context of the NZ
Resource Management Act, public goods are provided through regulation rather
than government provision.  Rates cover the administrative costs of designing
and implementing regulations, but this is a small fraction of the total economic
cost.  Implicitly, local government finances provision by “taking” resources.
Limiting the activities allowed on private land imposes costs.  To the extent that
this cost is correlated with property values, it operates in a similar way to a
property tax.  We will start by looking at the effects of property taxes on the
efficiency of devolution, and then return to the difference between tax provision
and regulatory provision.
When every person pays an equal amount for public services, poor people have
no incentive to move from a homogeneous poor district with low public services
and a low charge to a high-income district with high public services and a high
charge.   With property taxes, however, a poor person can buy a small house in
a rich district, enjoy the better public services and still pay a low amount.  If the
cost of public services rises with the number of people (as a result of
congestion, or private aspects of the public service), this disadvantages the rich
people. They will either wish to move to another area as poor people enter, or61
will try to exclude the poor people.  One way exclusion is done is by zoning a
minimum standard of housing so there is no low income housing available.  If
richer communities do not exclude poorer people, property taxes can make the
composition of communities, and hence the level of public goods provided in
them, unstable over time.26
This problem is reduced by the phenomenon of “capitalisation”.  The value of a
house depends not only on its physical characteristics, but also on the bundle of
public services ownership (or occupancy in the case of rental) entitles you to
consume.   A community with good public services will also have higher house
prices.  With perfect capitalisation, a poor person will be indifferent between the
rich and poor neighbourhoods because although the rich neighbourhood has
better services, the house prices are also higher.  Capitalisation reduces the
instability of communities, but does not ensure efficiency, either in production or
in the level of public good, within heterogeneous communities.
How do these conclusions vary when provision is achieved by regulation not
taxation?  Cost bearing is not related now to the value of the property.  It relates
to the effects of private activities on that property on the provision of public
goods.   For example, think of a company that would like to pollute.  By
restricting its pollution the regulation imposes a cost on the company.  The
company can move to another area with less stringent regulation or can bear
the cost and ultimately pass it on to their customers.  If the land the company
uses can be used for many purposes, its value will not be affected by this
regulation.  If there are other areas to produce, the cost of the regulation is low
because the company will move.  In any case this is an example of polluter
pays, where an externality is internalised.  This is efficient and often seen as
equitable.  No community instability issues arise.
A more complex case arises where an activity on a piece of land affects
provision of a positive externality or public good.  Two pieces of land could be
identical except that one is chosen for environmental or historical conservation.
The value of the chosen land will fall.  The owner of the chosen land at the time
of the regulation is harmed while the owner of the identical piece is not.  This is
called “takings” in the US.  A small group of unfortunate landowners are bearing
all the costs of providing a good, which we all enjoy.  If each regulation has a
small impact on each individual, and a large number of different regulations
affect different individuals, this all comes out in the wash, but it is not always the
case.  Under the RMA, these land use restriction related costs are all borne
through capitalisation.  The owner of the house at the time of the regulation
cannot avoid the cost of current regulation by moving away.  Migrants into the
area pay the cost of the benefits through higher house values.  The RMA will
not lead to unstable communities.
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Rich people may try to indirectly control these externalities by raising lot sizes and hence
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Appendix Four: Other Externalities
Tax externalities
A similar issue to the effects of regulation on migration, is that of tax
externalities.  Where there are non-constant returns to scale in public goods
provision, migration of individuals will affect the tax burdens in their origin and
destination communities. Individuals pay the average, not marginal, costs of
public goods. Because each individual regards the tax structure as fixed,
inefficient outcomes could occur.  Suppose an individual moves out of a small
community with low marginal costs but high average costs.  They raise the
average cost of public good provision for the remaining community.  If they
move into a large community where average costs are low but public goods are
congested so marginal costs are high, they will raise the cost there as well.  The
individual benefits from the move; society loses.  Figure 4 illustrates the effect of
community size on average, marginal and total costs.
Figure 8  Economies and Diseconomies of Scale in Community Size
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When public goods are financed with property taxes (or other constraints, which
affect richer people more) and there is congestion in public goods, a poor
person moving into a richer jurisdiction creates a “fiscal externality” because
they contribute less than the marginal cost of the public good.
Because resource related public goods are provided by controlling activity
rather than by taxing, these tax externalities do not occur directly.  However a
related problem does occur.  A migrant going from a low-density area to a high-
density area reduces externalities very little by leaving the low-density area
(marginal externalities are small).  When moving into a high-density area,
however, the marginal effect on pollution and other externalities could be much
higher than the average cost the individual bears.  Society may suffer from the
move while the individual benefits.  For example, an additional person moving
to Christchurch increases air pollution, which affects every resident of
Christchurch.  As well as affecting many people, damage from air pollution63
tends to be non-linear, so the extra pollution causes much more than the
average damage.
Mobility and choice of jurisdictions are limited, and the group that does move is
non-representative.  Thus jurisdictions will be still be internally heterogeneous,
and a purely entrepreneurial local government will misrepresent social
preferences.  Mobility can also reduce efficiency because of the externalities
migrants create.  The public choice mechanisms used within jurisdictions, and
how well they reflect constituent preferences, are critical for assessing the
effectiveness of devolution.
The effectiveness of decisions also depends on how well the political institution
reflects benefits and costs, how well objective information is used to improve
the quality of decision making, and how cost-effective the decision making
process itself is.
lnterjurisdictional Competition
When there are heterogeneous regulations across jurisdictions, both labour and
capital will choose the most attractive jurisdiction.  This creates healthy
competition among jurisdictions, but can also create two problems.  The first
problem arises if the supply of capital is very  elastic to each jurisdiction, i.e.
very mobile, and several jurisdictions try to attract it simultaneously.  This can
lead to a “race to the bottom” in local public good provision.  Each jurisdiction
offers slightly more attractive conditions to attract the elastic capital.  Other
jurisdictions respond with more attractive conditions still (lower taxes or more
lenient environmental regulations) leading to a downward spiral.  This can occur
even if the jurisdiction has a government that represents the constituents’
interests.27  No jurisdiction benefits from this in equilibrium.
The second problem arises if the local jurisdiction acts as an entrepreneur, and
maximises its revenue rather than representing constituent interests.  If one
factor is considered to be more mobile, the decision-makers may design
regulations to attract that factor at the expense of the other.  One example of
this is lax environmental regulation to attract manufacturing.  Labour will only
respond slowly to the poorer environmental quality, while capital may flow in
quickly, leading to short run revenue benefits.  This can also occur at the
national level and could be even more acute because internationally, labour is
less mobile than capital.
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“Not in my backyard”  NIMBY
This is a commonly observed phenomenon where every community opposes
housing an activity with negative local externalities, but positive net benefits for
society as a whole.  This problem does not arise because of the level of
decision making, though it can be “solved” by central government fiat.  It arises
because existing mechanisms are inadequate for compensating the affected
groups. Devolution makes these issues more visible, because local
communities have more say, but may not worsen the outcomes.   Although
siting may be more difficult, and possibly less efficient, the outcomes under
devolution may be fairer if compensating deals can be made.
A closely related issue is that of “environmental justice”.  This is a concern that
local authorities place a disproportionate number of landfills, toxic-waste dumps,
and other unattractive public facilities in poor and minority neighbourhoods.  If
this is true, (the evidence is mixed) and the community receives no
compensation, it may be a failure of the local public choice mechanism.  It is not
clear whether devolution worsens or improves this problem.  If devolution goes
down to the level of the minority community, such facilities cannot be foisted
upon them against their will.  Minorities may have a stronger voice in a smaller
community.  On the other hand, central government is often a leader in vertical
and racial equity issues.65
Appendix Five: Equitable sharing of costs and benefits
Local government is inherently bad at redistributing income, for a number of
reasons.  The analysis in the Tiebout framework and the public choice
framework is concerned primarily with efficiency not equity. The literature on
local public finance and redistribution deals with the effects of attempts to
redistribute income through progressive taxes or provision of public goods in a
location or of a type that makes them more valuable to poorer people.  In the
case of resource management we are not directly dealing with income
redistribution, but resource decisions do affect the distribution of wealth and
income, and the provision and protection of public goods and common
resources could have similar effects to taxes.
Local governments have limited ability to redistribute within their community.  If
a community has more progressive tax policies than others, mobility will lead
richer people to move out and poorer people to move in.  More progressive
policies are only possible where richer people have a preference for it, and
there is limited inward mobility of poor people.  New York City in the 1970s and
1980s is often cited as a case where progressivity failed.  Poor people
responded to generous welfare by moving in, and corporations moved out to the
suburbs.  If in some areas, the RMA provides public goods highly valued by
poorer people at the expense of richer people, it could induce the same
phenomenon.
If Tiebout-type mobility pressures make communities relatively homogeneous,
serious redistribution requires inter-jurisdictional transfers.  In the absence of
strong altruism by richer communities, this requires central coercion.
Even where taxes are raised in richer communities to finance intra-jurisdictional
redistribution, if this is not nation wide, mobility will lead to capitalisation of these
tax increases and lower property values in the higher tax areas.  Capitalisation
ultimately defeats the redistributive goal.
On the other hand some evidence suggests that smaller communities that are
more homogeneous on non-income grounds, e.g.:  race or religion, may be
more willing to redistribute income within the community.  Altruism is more
prevalent toward similar people, and where the effects are more visible.  Local
redistribution of this nature may avoid some of the efficiency, information (on
who is really needy and what they need), and enforcement problems inherent in
national redistribution programs.  Businesses in small communities may be
willing to comply with strict environmental standards to benefit their local
community, where they are unwilling to make similar sacrifices for the national
good.
In the context of the RMA, the people who lose are those whose activities are
restricted more than they value the average benefits from the public goods
created.  Some literature suggests that common resources and public goods66
disproportionately benefit poorer people who have less access to substitutes.28
Thus they may benefit from the RMA more than high-income people.  In
addition, in a transparent setting, political processes tend to lead to increased
progressivity.  When benefits and costs are non-transparent, policies may not
be progressive.
Some argue that poorer people benefit less, because environmental benefits
are often luxury goods.  If new housing developments are primarily supplying
poorer people, the increased prices of new houses resulting from RMA
constraints on land use and subdivision design, are heavily borne by non-
homeowners who tend to be poor.29  Non-homeowners also miss out on any
benefits from RMA which are capitalised into house prices.  On the other hand,
the costs of many RMA constraints are also capitalised into the price of the
land, and thus affect current landowners who tend to be better off.
Homeowners bear costs and realise benefits at the point in time when
unanticipated changes in the net value of public goods are announced or
observed.  The vertical equity balance depends on the nature of the public
goods provided, and hence whom they benefit, and the net effect on house
prices.  This is an empirical question.
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